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ABSTRACT 
The events of 9-11 illustrated to U.S. government and law enforcement agencies the critical need 
for definitive, cooperative and accountable gathering and sharing of intelligence for terrorist 
interdiction/prevention. Despite billions spent annually for this endeavor, huge gaps in communication 
sharing and accountability remain. This thesis illustrates the realities of these current issues facing 
homeland security, and proposes a conceptual model: Homeland Security Regional Cooperation Areas 
(HSRCAs), based on proven, cooperative, drug-interdiction model programs that effectively utilize 
resources, training, and establish inter-agency cooperation and accountability.  Soft Systems Methodology 
was used to study current realities and generate solutions for human factors, which have previously created 
the challenges in agency and program integration. The HSRCA model proposes specific performance 
management processes, as well as governance by administrative members (responsible for daily state and 
local law enforcement operations throughout the country). Such administrators placed in a collaborative 
environment are able to implement effective programs while satisfying federal objectives, within budget. 
HSRCAs will utilize state resources and existing fusion centers for shared regional communication, critical 
infrastructure protection and widespread training.  These activities—easily incorporated into daily activities 
of law enforcement officers—empowers them with critical tools and information to interdict and defeat 
terrorist activities. 
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A. PROBLEM   
1. Is It Working? Tough Answers to Tough Questions 
The question in homeland security today is not if it is needed, but is it effectively 
working?  Despite the intention of the millions of dollars being spent, accountability is 
lacking and finding best practices for nationwide implementation has been grueling at 
best.  Serious issues are currently affecting the success of homeland security. Past and 
current critical situations illustrate the information gaps that continue to exist and why.  
Some pervasive issues include brick walls of interagency mistrust; funding challenges; 
serious national inconsistency in the day-to-day operations of all officers and detectives; 
technological gaps and overall lack of effective, widespread homeland security training. 
This overall lack of consistency and ineffective accountability measures still leaves the 
nation at significant risk. 
The expressed mission of state and local public safety agencies is to provide a 
safe and secure environment for all people within their areas of responsibility. Homeland 
security is supposed to work hand-in-hand with this mission. Still, the fact remains that 
open communication, intelligence sharing, and cooperation between all agencies to 
interdict and disrupt terrorist activity is below par, and accountability is haphazard. Since 
the attacks of September 11, 2001, an enormous amount of money, time, and other 
resources have been applied to enhancing the homeland security and communication 
capabilities of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the country.  
Time and again, the question arises: Can portions of this multi-billion dollar 
funding be applied differently to increase the effectiveness and accountability of state and 
local law enforcement efforts in homeland security? As recently as March of 2008, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator David Paulison 
addressed the House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, which was 
inquiring as to how homeland security grant funding has been spent by state and local 
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governments since 2002. In a subsequent interview he stated, “We’ve put out $23.7 
billion worth of grants and so far nobody’s done an assessment of what kind of an impact 
is it having. Is it working or not?”1 This absolute lack of an assessment clearly indicates 
how imperative it is to look for new ways to improve effectiveness and discover an 
effective form of accountability or measurement as to how this funding is utilized. 
2. The Difficulty in Finding a Best Practice 
With the multitude of individual police agencies throughout the United States, it 
is a daunting task to find ‘a best practice’ for interconnecting all law enforcement 
resources. Still, the threats that the nation has faced in national security illustrates that 
cooperation and clear communication must be effectively put into place for no less than 
the safety of the nation. To date, efforts from federal homeland security grant guidelines 
have failed to create circumstances that consistently develop into effective information 
sharing between federal, state and local agencies. Although regionalization has been 
emphasized, interagency collaboration between state and local law enforcement officers 
is usually limited to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces operating in mostly metropolitan 
areas. Accountability, for the effectiveness of federally funded state and local homeland 
security programs is a concern for Congress.2  
An even more critical situation to address is that most state, local, and tribal 
agencies are minimally involved, as will be illustrated further. For example, when 
specialized homeland security units are implemented, they can be proficient in terrorist 
prevention and interdiction, yet it is important to note that a dangerous side-effect can 
occur on a department-wide level: it can ‘relieve’ the rest of a police agency from having 
homeland security responsibility or interest. The cultural attitude can develop is that 
national security measures are already being handled elsewhere, so that with all of the 
daily demands on patrol officers and detectives, homeland security may seriously fall 
down on a list of their priorities.  
                                                 
1 Chris Strohm, “Homeland Security—House Appropriators Urge Department to see if Grants are 
Improving Security,” Congress Daily (March 12, 2008), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/am_20080312_2.php? (accessed March, 28, 2008). 
2 Ibid. 
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This brings up the issue of consistent involvement across the board. While some 
law enforcement agencies have specialized public information and education divisions, 
others have patrol officers who contribute to this function as part of their regular 
responsibilities. The latter may help develop an appreciative sense by all officers for the 
value of effectively informing citizens on key public safety issues. The role and 
responsibility to be involved in homeland security efforts absolutely depends on a 
broader base of state, local and tribal law enforcement officers having an understanding 
and appreciation for the elements of homeland security, as well as the direction these 
officers are given from their leadership and how their specific agency’s homeland 
security approach is organized. A patrol officer may be less concerned with issues of 
homeland security if it is felt that his or her agency’s specialized unit is handling those 
matters. This can lead to disconnected communication on issues that would normally 
alert regular law enforcement to terrorist activity.  
State and local law enforcement agencies must make better, more consistent 
efforts to be engaged in counterterrorism efforts. It is through local and state police 
officers that terrorist activity will be detected, interdicted and defeated. To include patrol 
officers and detectives in homeland security training and information sharing, along with 
their regular responsibilities, will dramatically improve homeland security participation 
in a synergistic manner. This in turn will increase opportunities to connecting, collecting 
and sharing critical, relevant information relating to terrorist activities. Having an 
effective information sharing capability between local and state agencies and with their 
federal partners is critical for achieving real success in protecting the nation at its base 
level communities from terrorist threats.  
This thesis examines the impediments that state, local and tribal law enforcement 
agencies face in becoming regularly involved on a day-to-day basis in homeland security. 
(For the purpose of this thesis, the identification of state and local agencies shall include 
tribal law enforcement and any other non-federal law enforcement agencies.) It examines 
how some applications are applied to other local and national issues, such as drug 
interdiction, and explore whether the communication, collaboration and accountability 
concepts applied to them are suitable for similarly designing a homeland security method 
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with real potential for accountability and interdiction success. This thesis also proposes a 
set of powerful concepts and ideas of proven, best-practices that can be designed to 
utilize much of the state and local law enforcement resources to more effectively 
contribute in a coordinated national counter-terrorism effort.  
Mathew Bettenhausen, the California Director of Homeland Security, gave 
testimony in 2008 before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment. He stated:  
Prior to 9/11, State and locals were all too often an afterthought in 
counterterrorism efforts. This has proven to be a hard mindset to change. 
Many of our federal partners underestimate the unique capabilities of State 
and local public safety agencies. There has been progress on bringing 
locals into the counterterrorism effort, but we are not there yet. For this 
reason, I take every opportunity to remind my federal partners that, as 
counterterrorism efforts evolve, we must work with our first preventers to 
uncover the recruitment, fundraising (money-laundering), networking and 
operational planning of Islamic extremists in the United States.3 
3. Critical Lessons, Critical Awareness, Critical Sharing 
In order to examine the serious problems that interfere with successful state and 
local law enforcement participation in the national homeland security mission, one 
benefits from examining noted examples related to the critical importance that these 
officers play in the day-to-day duties of counter-terrorism. It is important that state and 
local law enforcement play a key role in countering terrorism. The Oklahoma City 
bombing was a wake-up call for all agencies involved in interdicting terrorist activity 
throughout the nation.   
At 9:02 AM on April 19, 1995, a domestic terrorist named Timothy McVeigh 
detonated a truck bomb in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma killing 168 men, women and children. Trooper Charlie Hanger of the 
                                                 
3 Mathew Bettenhausen, “Moving Beyond the First Five Years: Evolving the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis to Better Serve, State, Local, and Tribal Needs,” (testimony before the House Homeland 
Security Committee Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment: 
California Office of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., April 24, 2008), 2, Committee of Homeland 
Security, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080424101901-92489.pdf (accessed March 30, 
2009). 
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Oklahoma State Patrol subsequently arrested Timothy McVeigh during a routine traffic 
stop. McVeigh was tried, convicted and executed as a result.4 Since this event, state and 
local law enforcement agencies have better realized the importance of their potential in 
preventing acts of terrorism. A great deal of planning and preparation went into 
McVeigh’s terrorist act. The goal must be for state and local officers to be better educated 
and informed so that they may detect elements of terrorist activity before such acts can be 
carried out.  
This incident helps illustrate the realistic potential that state and local law 
enforcement officers can play in the pursuit of detecting and preventing terrorist acts 
within the United States. For example, it was not widely appreciated in law enforcement 
prior to the 1995 bombing that the U.S. had threats of terrorism from within its borders. 
Consider the hypothetical scenario that has a state trooper stop McVeigh prior to setting 
the bomb. What if there had been an established network of state and local police officers 
who aggressively pursued criminal activity and shared potential criminal and terrorist 
related information within their state, region and across the country in an effective and 
consistent manner?  
There were acts and communications that could have cued officers to McVeigh’s 
criminal and terrorist potential. Having such information readily available to a patrol-
level officer or detective is vital to increasing their potential of interdicting terrorist 
activity on a fundamental level. However, intelligence sharing in federal databases is 
often kept too confidential. Programs and systems designed with a federal perspective are 
not as likely to effectively address a local problem as those that allow for local 
conception and execution. The country has not yet achieved consistent state and local 
levels of homeland security awareness that increases the likelihood of interdicting an 
actor like McVeigh prior to a terrorist event.  
                                                 
4 Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Oklahoma City: Seven 
Years Later-Lessons for Other Communities (Oklahoma City: Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
2002) http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/MIPT-OKC7YearsLater.pdf (accessed March 30, 2009). 
 6
What can be learned from this example and countless others is that information 
sharing must go both ways. There is a need for two-way counter-terrorist information 
sharing between agencies. 
Local agencies must be able to submit information in a climate that supports 
interdiction, but will not interfere with sensitive cases. Despite the advent of fusion 
centers, vast amounts of criminal information still fails to be submitted to these facilities 
from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and officers. Without this regular 
and all-encompassing flow of information, the likelihood of successful homeland security 
and criminal interdiction is greatly diminished.  
State and local law enforcement agencies are effectively engaged in the day-to-
day mission of responding to incidents of criminal activity, investigating the crimes and 
arresting the perpetrators. The job is both reactionary and proactive. The number of 
arrests can be a measure of success in both realms. If a specific crime rate is down, it can 
be reflective of aggressive, proactive law enforcement efforts. Sir Robert Peel, “the father 
of modern policing” stated in his nine principles of modern policing: “The test of police 
efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action 
in dealing with it.”5  
The police mission and profession have evolved over centuries of civilized human 
development. Modern police agencies are primarily well-equipped with highly-trained 
personnel who are dedicated to making their communities and geographic areas of 
responsibility safer. Adding equipment to protect facilities and mass gathering events 
must not be the most significant measure of how law enforcement agencies are 
addressing homeland security at the state and local levels. Since 9/11, much of the 
homeland security grant funding has gone towards material things. Having a homeland 
security component incorporated into the everyday duties of officers in the field can be 
and should be a part of the professional evolution of modern police services. It is through 
state and local officers having understanding of the problem and their coordinated 
efficiency that acts of terrorism will be thwarted.  An important note:  program 
                                                 
5 Magna Carta Plus, The Nine Principles by Sir Robert Peel, Magna Carta Plus, (November 20020) 
http://www.magnacartaplus.org/briefings/nine_police_principles.htm (accessed July 26, 2008).  
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administrators must be careful in their processes so that the law enforcement efforts 
applied to homeland security are not overly measured by how much equipment and 
personnel are deployed.  Homeland security success can also be measured by  
how police agencies share information and cooperatively target resources for prevention 
and by the absence of terrorist activity that results. 
4. Background of Problem 
Incorporating the homeland security mission into the regular responsibilities of 
state and local law enforcement agencies involves several considerations that should all 
be deliberated on: 
• Unique Systems—Each agency has its own unique systems based upon history, 
development, goals, and its reaction to and preventing local crime. 
• Behaviors—Based upon systems in place, the behavior of officers at the lower levels 
have to reflect the departments’ unique goals and needs. 
• Trust—History of communication and trust (or lack thereof) with other agencies, 
especially federal, has a huge effect on information sharing. 
• Numbers of Personnel Assigned—Taking into consideration the already 
burdensome reality of paperwork and accountability in everyday law enforcement 
responsibilities. 
• Related Costs—Technology, manpower, time, coordination and training must all be 
considered. 
• Real and Perceived Threats in Specific Jurisdictions—New York City, New York 
verses Coure'de'laine, Idaho verses any small, medium or large town, USA. Every 
area in the country has its own real and perceived threats and its unique part to play in 
combating terrorism. No area is more important, nor should any areas be overlooked. 
To create a blanket approach that will work the same in any given area of the 
country is not realistic. Each local jurisdiction, state and region of the country has 
circumstances and professional cultures that have developed. Agencies will always have 
some problems and tactics in common, but administrative relationships and interactive 
practices may be somewhat varied. Allowing agencies to participate in the identification 
of local threats and designing the best method of applying their resources to a national 
effort may increase the level of effective homeland security participation and 
accountability.  
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Especially since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, federal, state and 
local police jurisdictions have struggled to play a meaningful role in the added mission of 
homeland security. Despite billions of federal dollars being spent on increased police 
involvement in homeland security, overall only a small portion of police services are 
applied to the effort. Homeland security remains a nebulous concept to most street and 
command-level police officers. The majority of homeland security prevention programs 
and systems have been developed and directed by federal agencies. Federal agencies will 
always play a critical role in homeland security investigations and are very effective at 
gathering and coordinating national homeland security intelligence and other related 
information. Their emphasis in connecting domestic terrorist activity to its foreign ties is 
imperative to a successful intelligence database and an overall homeland security law 
enforcement network. The current areas of weakness involve the continued failure of 
providing important information to field-level law enforcement officers and vice versa. 
Field-level officers are not largely nor routinely feeding potential homeland security 
information to databases that can screen for terrorist connections to their investigations. 
Additionally, these officers are not routinely checking criminal suspects against such 
databases. Most state and local police officers have had little or no training in this area—
training that must be specifically designed to help them recognize potential elements of 
terrorist activity and to understand the significance of shared information and intelligence 
in the national homeland security mission. Intelligence dots are out there, but they are 
simply not being connected.  
B. BREAKING DOWN BRICK WALLS TO CREATE A TRUE, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY 
On July 16, 2002, President George W. Bush wrote in his opening letter 
describing the National Strategy for Homeland Security: “This is a national strategy, not 
a federal strategy.”6 The truth is, however, that most state and local police officers rarely 
interact with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). While the existing federally-driven method of structuring homeland 
                                                 
6 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, Letter to the American 
People, Office of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), 5. 
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security has been worthy in many ways, it has continued to fail in producing the level of 
interagency cooperation and information sharing that is necessary to effectively utilize 
the nationwide police resources that are available for homeland security purposes. In 
contrast, local police and sheriff agencies have learned to interact with state law 
enforcement services on a regular basis as part of their normal duties. State police 
agencies often interact with each other on regional and national projects and their 
coordinated efforts can be extremely effective. Creating a homeland security network 
model for state and local police has the potential to create an interior web of policing and 
information sharing throughout the United States that would greatly reduce the ability for 
individual terrorists and terrorist cells to operate undetected.  
Recently, Representative Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi, the Chairman of 
the House Homeland Security Committee stated: 
The 9/11 Act was clear. Homeland security doesn’t happen just in 
Washington, D.C. Preventing the next terrorist attack requires new and 
strong partnerships with state, local, and tribal leaders, especially in law 
enforcement. Put simply, our police and sheriffs’ officers in the course of 
their crime-fighting duties are in the best position to stop a terrorist plot in 
its tracks. If we don’t have a Department or an intelligence office that 
knows how to meet their needs, we’re failing.7 
The use of Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) is paramount to national, state and 
local homeland security success. ILP should be synonymous with homeland security at 
the state and local police levels. According to the New Jersey State Police:  
The key to ILP is to answer the need for targeted resource allocation to 
combat crime, terrorism and other law enforcement issues through 
improved, situational awareness. For the trooper on the road, this requires 
feeding information into intelligence databases and receiving intelligence 
to assist patrol operations. At the detective and analysts’ level, it refers to 
the broader understanding of issues that affect state policing throughout 
the state.8  
                                                 
7 Bennie G. Thompson, “Moving Beyond the First Five Years: Evolving the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to Better Serve, State, Local, and Tribal Needs,” (testimony before the House Homeland Security 
Committee Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment: California 
Office of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., April 24, 2008), Committee on Homeland Security, 
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080424102123-27335.pdf (accessed March 30, 2009). 
8 New Jersey State Police, Practical Guide to Intelligence Led Policing (New York, NY: Manhattan 
Institute for Policy Research, 2006), Center for Policing Terrorism, http://www.cpt-
mi.org/pdf/NJPoliceGuide.pdf (accessed March 30, 2009). 
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ILP also provides for more effective policing, information sharing and improved 
communication and coordination of efforts within neighboring states.9 From a law 
enforcement administrative standpoint, ILP provides the senior law enforcement agency’s 
leadership with improved awareness of events and activity that affect the broader scope 
of all police activities. 
1. Fusion Centers Create Opportunities for Intelligence Led Policing 
In examining the importance of information sharing, the proliferation of fusion 
centers around the country promises to provide greater opportunity for more agencies to 
participate. The primary function of fusion centers is to fuse together key resources from 
local, state, federal agencies and critical, infrastructure-related private industries. First 
Sergeant Lee Miller of the Virginia State Police oversees the operation of the Virginia 
Fusion Center. He states:  
In order to be a true intelligence led policing model, local, state and 
federal analysts must be able to see all information and intelligence. If 
analysts are provided only a couple pieces of the puzzle, we will never be 
able to see the overall picture. Local, state, tribal and federal agencies as 
well as private industry have individual pieces, and we must have an 
information technology mechanism as well as trusted relationships to put 
these pieces together.10  
First, Sgt. Miller also points out that local and state intelligence professionals 
must be given the same opportunity as their federal counterparts regarding the access to 
classified information systems.11 Only by opening the doors to complete two-way 
information and intelligence sharing will true homeland security effectiveness take place. 
From an overall perspective, it makes more sense to provide a means for the nation’s law 
                                                 
9 New Jersey State Police, Practical Guide to Intelligence Led Policing, 4. 
10 Lee Miller, “Homeland Security Information Network: Moving Past the Missteps Toward Better 
Information Sharing: Testimony of First Sergeant Lee Miller, Virginia State Police” (testimony for the 
United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Washington, D.C., May 10, 2007), 2,  Committee on 
Homeland Security, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070510132259-40476.pdf (accessed 
March 30, 2009). 
11 Ibid., 3. 
 11
enforcement professionals to be alerted to who the terrorists are and where they are 
suspected to be operating, than to be overly cautious in protecting information for fear 
that a few might be alerted. The benefits on interdicting terrorist activity in process 
should truly far outweigh other consequences. Depending on federal authorities to 
identify and monitor every potential domestic and international terrorist threat in the U.S. 
is unrealistic.  
2. Need for Enhancing TSC and NCIC Application—and Top-Down 
Trust 
The FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) began operations in 2003. It was 
created to ensure that government investigators, screeners, agents and state and local law 
enforcement officers have ready access to the information and expertise they need to 
respond quickly when a suspected terrorist is screened or stopped. TSCs are designed to 
consolidate access to terrorist watch lists from multiple agencies and provide 24/7 
operational support for thousands of federal, state and local law enforcement officers 
across the country.12  
From a state and local perspective, this system has great potential, but could be 
greatly enhanced for ideal working situations. Currently, time delays in receiving 
information from the TSC can be deeply problematic. Officers are only legally permitted 
to detain individuals for a reasonable amount of time during a traffic stop. If a state or 
local officer encounters a subject who is on a terrorist watch list, the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) will have only a flag on an individual’s information. The 
NCIC is given an alert for the officer to contact the TSC. Once contacted, the TSC has 
various steps that must be taken and separate checks that must be handed off from one 
individual to another. This may result in long delays. Additionally, the TSC will only 
provide unclassified information. The street officer may be jeopardized by unclear 
communications from the TSC based on what they are able to communicate.  
                                                 
12 Donna A. Bucella, “Statement of Donna A. Bucella to the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, January 26, 2004,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7/witness_bucella.htm (accessed March 
30, 2009). 
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3. Clearer Communication Necessary to Facilitate Interdiction of 
Terrorists  
A recent example illustrating the critical need for trust between federal and local 
agencies involved a Utah Highway Patrol trooper making a traffic stop on an individual 
who was traveling through the state. The trooper ran the normal law enforcement checks 
on the individual. Sometime after the trooper had released the subject, he was contacted 
by the FBI to be debriefed. The resulting information provided by the trooper led to the 
issuance of a federal arrest warrant for the subject on a firearm violation.13 No specific 
details of the FBI’s additional interest in the subject were communicated to the trooper or 
his agency except for an informal mention of a possible homeland security interest. The 
trooper’s original traffic stop led to the high-profile search of a Muslim mosque in an 
eastern state.14 This serves as an example of a missed opportunity to quickly and 
effectively communicate information back to the state and local agencies that could assist 
their officers in being better able to detect future subjects who may have a homeland 
security nexus. As discussed previously in reference to the Oklahoma City bombing by 
Timothy McVeigh, were there specific indicators available that would alert an officer to 
investigate further? It is important to clarify that this does not mean that the state and 
local agencies always need investigation details of a sensitive or classified nature. 
However, providing information to the agencies related to specific threats and potential 
identifiers of terrorist activity will increase the possible interdiction opportunities in 
future contacts. State and local officers must be informed and trained if they are going to 
be alert to similar situations.  
4. ‘Attitude Reflects Leadership’—Overcoming a Lack of Trust 
A reverse example of the lack of trust in information sharing between local, state 
and federal agencies involves the Utah Criminal Information Center (UCIC). In 2003, 
command officers from the UCIC traveled throughout Utah meeting with police chiefs, 
                                                 
13 Author’s personal knowledge and involvement as a commander with the Utah Department of Public 
Safety. 
14 Pittsburg-Post Gazette, “Ex-Con Guilty in Gun Case,” (April 3, 2004), http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/07093/774749-53.stm (accessed August 4, 2008). 
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sheriffs, commanders and other law enforcement officers. They made presentations 
regarding the resources available to local agencies if they would be willing to participate 
by providing information to the UCIC. The UCIC commanders explained that by 
providing criminal investigative information to the center, it would be entered into the 
FBI’s databases. Despite the promotion of the UCIC services, local law enforcement 
agencies failed to participate to any significant degree. A common concern given by 
representatives of the local agencies involved their perception that investigative case 
information could be compromised, and that they would receive little information in 
return due to federal restrictions. The effort may have been better received if it had been 
presented as a multi-agency resource, designed to bring about federal state and local 
information sharing.  
5. Transitioning from ‘Us Verses Them’ to Cooperative Policing 
In March of 2008, the UCIC began transitioning from a unit that primarily served 
federal investigations to a state fusion center designed to provide services to all law 
enforcement agencies. Its name has been changed to the Utah Statewide Information and 
Analysis Center (SIAC), and it is being moved from its co-housed location at the FBI 
building to a Utah Department of Public Safety facility. Through this transition, most of 
the local police and sheriff agencies have committed to participating with the center and 
sharing information. The FBI will remain a great partner and supply personnel to the new 
center, but it is important to note that with these changes the level of interagency trust 
and cooperation with information sharing is greatly increasing.15  
6. Funding Issues, Areas of Control and Consistency 
The Domestic Counterterrorism portion of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security begins:  
The attacks of September 11 and the catastrophic loss of life and property 
that resulted have redefined the mission of federal, state, and local law 
enforcement authorities. While law enforcement agencies will continue to  
                                                 
15 Author’s personal knowledge and involvement overseeing the development of the Utah Statewide 
Information and Analysis Center. 
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investigate and prosecute criminal activity, they should now assign 
priority to preventing and interdicting terrorist activity within the United 
States.16  
Since that time, much of the nation’s law enforcement homeland security 
endeavors have been hit and miss. Some of the successes seem to be related to the 
amount of continued funding that an area receives, but that funding has been less than 
consistent. In fiscal year 2006, DHS determined the urban area eligibility for funding 
based on a formula that assessed each area’s relative risk of terrorism.17 Other state and 
local programs that were initiated when per capita homeland security funding was more 
available have been decreased. It seems to make sense to prepare for terrorist attacks that 
potentially target large metropolitan areas, as they provide opportunity for maximum 
impact and high body counts. However, equal consideration needs to be given to other 
law enforcement agencies that are able to commit to building unified systems and 
procedures allowing for better-shared information and coordinated enforcement. These 
agencies are often poised to detect terrorist activity that may be using less densely 
populated areas to live, plan and train.  
Providing federal funding for homeland security to state and local agencies has 
been an evolving and difficult prospect. As previously mentioned, $23.7 billion in 
homeland security grant funding has been provided to state and local government 
agencies. Currently, a House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee is 
looking into tracking how billions of dollars in grant funding have been spent by state 
and local governments since 2002.18  
                                                 
16 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 25. 
17 William O. Jenkins, Homeland Security Grants: Application on Process DHS Used to Allocate 
Funds to Selected Urban Areas (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office,  
2007), 1-2, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07381r.pdf (accessed March 30, 2009). 
18 Chris, Strohm, “Appropriators Urge DHS to See if Grants are Improving Security,” Congress Daily, 
(March 12, 2008), http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/congressdaily (accessed March, 28, 2008). 
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7. Current Focus of HLS Creating Gaps in Interdiction and Protection 
from Threat 
The House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman, 
Representative David Price said, “The grant funding equation depends on several 
variables, including our ability to measure and reduce risk, and on precisely how the 
requirements we place on our state and local partners are defined.”19 Funding that 
primarily considers threat and vulnerability-based metropolitan areas—without proper 
consideration of peripheral threats—may be missing the real potential that state patrols, 
rural sheriff’s offices and municipal police agencies have to provide critical information 
and interdict terrorist operators prior to an event. A balanced and coordinated effort needs 
to be achieved. Terrorist planning, training and preparation for urban area attacks are 
likely to take place in rural locales. If urban law enforcement preparedness plans do not 
incorporate the resources and potential connections developed by their more rural law 
enforcement counterparts, an island concept of increased homeland security around 
metropolitan areas may develop. This might serve to protect more significant targets but 
will provide fewer opportunities for successful terrorist identification and interdiction 
prior to an attack—precisely the prevention strategies that the nation needs. 
The current practice of providing primary homeland security funding to the 
largest metropolitan police agencies (that are determined to be more likely an area of 
attack and vulnerability) is potentially missing many realistic opportunities for a 
substantial and effective homeland security-coordinated law enforcement effort. The 
Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI’s) are primarily focused on homeland security 
issues within their metropolitan jurisdictional boundaries because of the specific grant 
funding mandates involved. The threat based rationale seems to serve well in a 
protective, response and mitigation role, but without connectivity and coordination with 
less threat-based state and local agencies, its true overall preventive measure may not be 
achieved. There are only 88,496 federal law enforcement agents and over 708,000 sworn 
state and local law enforcement officers in the U.S. Of the 12,666 municipal police 
                                                 
19 Strohm, “Appropriators Urge DHS to See if Grants are Improving Security.” 
 16
agencies, most have less than 24 sworn officers. There are 164,711 sheriff deputies and 
the 49 state police agencies have 56,348 sworn troopers and agents.20 These numbers 
represent an incredible amount of police activity. With all of the traffic stops and criminal 
investigations taking place every day, there is still a limited sharing of real and potential 
homeland security information.  
8. Funding Top-Down Instead of Bottom-Up Misses the Point 
It is critical that a true, two-way flow of homeland security information, which 
allows state and local officers to recognize elements of a terrorist threat when it is 
encountered, needs to be established.  Even with the billions of dollars applied to local, 
state and federal levels, most agencies are not there yet. A successful law enforcement 
network needs to be created that is fairly standardized in each state and is able to 
seamlessly breach jurisdictions and specifically-funded programs. Too often, homeland 
security efforts are hampered because one jurisdiction has specific funding and others are 
not included. Whether this is caused by grant restrictions or because one agency did not 
apply (due to a myriad of reasons such as time or budget constraints), it can result in 
inconsistent capabilities throughout regions and large gaps in communication and critical 
information sharing. 
A separately funded homeland security initiative that overlays these individual 
programs and projects can be the interconnecting vehicle that ties information and 
strategic operations together. Such a system should be established with considerations for 
interaction between state and local law enforcement agencies and regional partners in 
adjacent states. This system should be further networked to tie the states and regions 
together in a national working web of homeland security that meshes easily with the day 
to day activity of all law enforcement. Again, what clearly gets in the way is that most of 
the contemporary homeland security models have specialized law enforcement units as 
the means to incorporate homeland security at the state and local levels. The specialized 
homeland security units, like the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, are generally designed for 
                                                 
20 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Law Enforcement Statistics,” U.S. Department of Justice, 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (accessed June 12, 2007). 
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limited numbers of specially-trained state and local officers to work directly with the 
federal agencies.21 These taskforces have sound purpose, but do not work to effectively 
share information with those officers outside of the unit. Specialized units often remain 
similarly isolated from the regular agency operations, and federal agencies are not 
exposed to the information available from wide scale day-to-day contact with the public.  
Therefore, the same issues will continue to manifest.  The true, effective goal should be 
incorporating homeland security measures into what all street-level police officers do in 
their day-to-day pursuits of criminal activity.  
9. Creating an Effective Web of Counter-Terrorism Must Involve All 
Agencies 
An all-encompassing, patrol-oriented homeland security approach as part of 
regular operations creates a web effect that has the potential to be very effective at 
intercepting and disrupting terrorist activity. To give an example, a state trooper in 
Colorado stops a vehicle involved in smuggling migrant workers from Mexico into the 
interior United States. A check of the individual’s names and/or fingerprints is submitted 
to the Colorado Fusion Center, which contacts the other fusion centers in the Rocky 
Mountain Region. One individual’s fingerprint identifies him as a possible associate of a 
suspected member of a terrorist cell in Las Vegas, Nevada. This intelligence has been 
developed from local investigations. The trooper in Colorado is then cued to investigate 
additionally to determine if a possible homeland security incident might be taking place 
beyond the apparent immigration and human trafficking issues. Unfettered by federal 
classification restraints, Las Vegas police authorities could then provide immediate 
information that they have developed from their own investigation. This immediate 
insight would help the Colorado trooper assess the totality of the circumstances. Other 
agencies, such as the FBI, could now respond quickly with additional information and 
specialized resources if necessary. It is through identifying ways of developing efficiently 
operating networks and building interagency relationships that such relative terrorist 
connections will be made and interceded.  
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Justice, “Joint Terrorism Task Force,” U.S. Department of Justice, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jttf (accessed August 24, 2008). 
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10. Technology Supporting Intelligence Gathering  
The technology already exists for this type of efficiency. The key will be 
overcoming the tendencies that individual states and police agencies have of creating 
their own and separate systems. The other important need is for the information 
pertaining to an individual who is being contacted by police to be immediately queried 
against relevant criminal and homeland security databases. Part of the problem exists 
because too much of the federal data analysis process is devoted to storing, analyzing and 
disseminating information. This can be a very costly and difficult procedure to manage, 
especially when one considers the vast amount of criminal justice information that is 
being processed by all of the state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the 
U.S.  Better utilization of the state fusion centers as a networked resource for state and 
local agencies to share information regionally and nationally could provide more 
opportunity for discovery of terrorist activity. 
11. Connecting the Dots and Eliminating the Waste of Duplication 
There is a need for law enforcement officers to determine if the subject of their 
investigation is also being investigated by another agency so that the dots can be 
connected. Technology needs to be utilized to point to related databases so that officers 
can directly communicate information related to their separate investigations. There is 
also a great duplication of services by having many independent intelligence analysts 
simultaneously working at various centers and employed by individual agencies. A 
networked system that points to where related information may be located will promote 
better efficiency.  
A large part of an intelligence analyst’s job is to individually search for specific 
information from several potential databases that might contain information related to an 
investigation. A better use of resources would be for each state to have a similar and 
compatible information system. Instead of collecting and storing various criminal and 
homeland security information, these systems would create an index that linked to other 
existing databases containing related information. More analysts’ work could be devoted 
to finding duplicate records at the index and associating them with individual suspect 
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information. Analysts could have more opportunities to find common patterns and trends 
as opposed to spending much of their valuable time doing the work of independently 
searching various data systems. Using the commonality of state fusion centers can serve 
as a platform for improved regional and national information sharing between state and 
local agencies with their federal partners being the benefactor of increased identification 
potential. Existing analysts from many independent agencies could be better networked to 
serve the larger good on a state and regional basis.  
12. Homeland Security-Specific Training Needs 
Homeland security-related training is another overlooked and greatly needed 
service that the individual states could develop and share with federal assistance. State 
and local police officers are well-trained in many facets of law enforcement specialties, 
but not homeland security. Training and equipment are provided to increase officer’s 
potential for curbing specific threats that impact communities. The quality of training and 
access to information allows officers to successfully target various crimes. One poignant 
example would be asking a patrol officer to place an emphasis on driving under the 
influence (DUI) violations without providing him or her with related training. His or her 
likelihood for success in making DUI arrests would be minimal if he or she was not 
familiar with the indicators of impaired driving. Many state and local law enforcement 
agencies have been very successful in developing drug interdiction training for their 
officers. Such training teaches officers to look for indicators of drug smuggling while 
performing their regular traffic enforcement duties. Providing comprehensive and up-to-
date homeland security-related training to all state and local police agencies is imperative 
to successful terrorist interdiction. Nothing more strongly can be said than that. The open 
communication that training brings allows officers the opportunity to realize and identify 
terrorist threats that may be encountered as part of their regular law enforcement duties. 
Sharing successful terrorist interdiction information among officers around the country 
would not only foster a greater appreciation for the threats, but underline their important 
role in prevention. 
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13. Following a Proven Model for Clear Change, Consistency and 
Accountability 
While it is a difficult and daunting task to find a best-practice that will effectively 
eliminate all of the issues that have arisen with the current implementation of homeland 
security, it naturally makes sense to find proven, working, cooperative models that 
effectively address other issues that threaten the nation. Utilizing the lessons learned and 
the strengths of effective drug interdiction models, a new homeland security model can 
be created for effective counter-terrorism efforts across the United States and even 
internationally. Homeland Security Regional Cooperation Areas (HSRCA’s) could 
greatly improve security efforts using a bottom-up approach that mirrors the drug 
interdiction models. For study and implementation purposes, using the Soft Systems 
Methodology allows opportunities for consideration of human factors that can interfere 
with integrating agencies and programs.  
The HSRCA model, proposed later, includes utilizing performance management 
processes governed by members who are responsible for daily state and local law 
enforcement operations in various areas of the country. These administrators, if placed in 
a collaborative environment, will have innate abilities to implement programs into state 
and local jurisdictions that satisfy federal directives. There is a need for this to be 
accomplished in an evolving manner that promotes cooperation, collaboration and 
sustainable purpose. Local fusion centers are utilized as the basis for shared 
communication and training that is easily and consistently incorporated into the day-to-
day activities of patrol officers. Despite significant differences in cultural norms that exist 
in agencies across the country; empowering them with the tools and information they 
need to build progressive homeland security programs will increase their ability and 
opportunity to interdict and defeat terrorist activities—thereby keeping the homeland safe 
from attack using a fiscally responsible and performance-accountable method. 
C. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 attacks established a 
definitive need for first responders to also be first preventers. Billions of dollars are being 
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spent in support of this effort and yet efficiency, open communication and accountability 
are seriously lacking. This thesis attempts to capture the realities of current issues facing 
homeland security. Such issues as interagency collaboration, communication, 
effectiveness and accountability are paramount to law enforcement’s role in the 
homeland security mission. It also attempts to capture the true strengths of working drug 
interdiction models and proposes the use of HSRCAs to mirror effectiveness and improve 
implementation and costs by utilizing resources already in place.  In addition, the thesis 
proposes that the use of HSRCAs could greatly increase national security while 
implementing a widespread cooperative spirit in homeland security where all agencies 
are integrally involved on a day-to-day basis. With such a model, accountability would 
increase exponentially resulting in more efficient use of limited federal resources.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. IMPROVEMENTS IN HOMELAND SECURITY   
1. Research: The First Step to Change 
Clearly, there has been an understandable outcry for improved state and local 
participation in homeland security since the 9/11 attacks. Fortunately, however, there 
have been significant improvements in some specific areas, including the advancement of 
state and regional fusion centers throughout the country that has prompted much 
discussion and led to some communication innovations. There are considerable amounts 
of research and writing related to state and local agencies’ involvement in the nation’s 
homeland security. Hundreds of government reports have been written and innumerable 
studies have been launched. 
The importance of state and local agencies participating in national homeland 
security efforts has been discussed and included since the attacks, especially since local 
first responders have had to bear the responsibilities of immediately taking action after 
the terrorist attacks and have had to face all of the ramifications of such attacks. Since 
that time, state and local governments have taken on a shared responsibility in preparing 
for catastrophic terrorist attacks.  However, it is important to note that out of necessity, 
the initial responsibility still falls upon local police, fire, emergency medical personnel 
and health agencies.22 Subsequently, they must take part in preventing attacks upon their 
citizens. Much has been written and proposed about this subject since then.  In addition to 
all of the documents, a very considerable amount of testimony has been given before U.S. 
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate Committees and subcommittees relating to 
issues of state and local involvement in homeland security. A minority staff report for the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs starts out:  
                                                 
22 Randall A. Yim, Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an 
Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002), 2, General Accounting Office, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02621t.pdf  (accessed March 30, 2009). 
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America’s safety demands that state and local officials, especially law 
enforcement and public safety professionals -- our front line defenders—
are fully engaged in the war against terrorism.23  
The United States Government Accountability Office has produced many reports 
that address state and local needs. There are currently 74 Naval Post Graduate theses or 
research papers that include state and local involvement in the titles or summary. This 
alone points to the dramatic and pressing need to include the state and local agencies in 
all degrees of homeland security planning and implementation. 
In studying the plethora of information available on homeland security, it is 
important to note that it is not easy to identify one best practice. For example, important 
intelligence available from state, tribal and local government agencies may forewarn of 
another massive, future attack. Interdiction of these acts of terrorism can be accomplished 
through the regular, everyday activities and crime control services already offered. 
Successful counterterrorism efforts require that federal, state, tribal, local and private-
sector entities have an effective information sharing and collaboration capability.24 In 
2004, the 9/11 Commission Report cited one significant lesson learned from the events of 
the previous three-and-a-half years is that state and local agencies are significant partners 
in homeland security: The new “grass roots” war against terrorism must include more 
connectivity between local, state and federal agencies; combining resources and 
intelligence for the good of all to provide the level of national and domestic security 
demanded by the people of the United States.25  
                                                 
23 United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, State and Local Officials: Still Kept in 
the Dark about Homeland Security, 108th Cong., 1st sess., Minority Staff Report, (2003), 1, 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/sprt10833min_hs_statelocal.pdf  (accessed March 30, 2009). 
24 William A. Forsyth, “State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers: An Evaluative Approach in 
Modeling a State Fusion Center,” (master’s thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2005), 2. 
25 National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the Untied States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 353-356. 
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2. Effective National Strategies Must be Outlined before Truly Effective 
National Action can be Taken 
The importance of state and local agencies playing significant roles in the national 
homeland security effort is identified in the following: 
• National Strategy for Information Sharing 
• President’s National Security Strategy 
• National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
• National Strategy for Homeland Security 
Without effective cooperation of state and local agencies, a national strategy is 
only a strategy and not a form of effective action.  However, there must be a systematic 
approach to providing opportunities for state and local agencies to be involved in what 
was always previously considered a federal issue. 
On December 16, 2005, in accordance with section 1016 of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the President issued a Memorandum to 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies prescribing the guidelines and 
requirements in support of the creation and implementation of the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE). In Guideline Two of that memo, the President stressed that “war on 
terror must be a national effort” and, therefore, one in which state, local, and tribal 
governments and the private sector are afforded appropriate opportunities to participate 
as full partners in the ISE. Accordingly, he directed that a common framework be 
developed to govern the roles and responsibilities of federal departments and agencies 
relating to the sharing of terrorism information, homeland security information and law 
enforcement information among federal departments and agencies, state, local and tribal 
governments and private sector entities.26  
Many studies have cited the inadequate successes of state and local agencies 
being incorporated into the federal efforts of homeland security. In 2003 a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) study found that the poor coordination of information sharing 
                                                 
26 Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and 
Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2007), 
13, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA473664 (accessed March 30, 2009). 
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efforts could cause important clues regarding impending terrorist attacks to go unnoticed. 
It further reported that states and local agencies were not receiving adequate information 
and that many federal agency representatives believe that they are primarily responsible 
for gathering and maintaining homeland security information and concerned with sharing 
potentially sensitive national information with state and local agencies.27 Despite some 
advances, there is still much progress to be made. 
In other words, it is time for this homeland security to be truly considered national 
in nature and not simply a federal program with federal mandates. Therefore, it must 
include initiatives that fully and successfully take into consideration the resources, 
manpower, missions and availability to prevent future attacks on a basic, community-
wide level that interacts from community-to-community, state-to-state and agency-to-
agency, creating a true web of critical information that can stop terrorism in its tracks.  
                                                 
27 United States General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information 





This thesis seeks to identify improved methods of utilizing existing resources of 
state and local law enforcement agencies as part of the integral overall national homeland 
security strategy. The goal is to examine alternative methods of applying state and local 
resources in a more involved and effective homeland security program. Using Soft 
Systems Methodology (SSM) instead of a hard systems methodology allows the study of 
the complexities of the systems, programs, behaviors, beliefs and cultures involved in 
collaboration, program design, data gathering and sharing procedures, accountability and 
training—already in place in existing programs. Too often, proposed programs seem very 
sound, but fail to achieve success because human factors such as pride, ego and 
protection of territory prevent the hard systems to function effectively. The soft systems 
human considerations of organizational design and lessons learned in this thesis could 
increase the nation’s opportunities to keep citizens safe from terrorist attack.  
1. Defining, Prescribing and Utilizing State and Local Resources  
Building an improved method of providing homeland security services by state 
and local law enforcement agencies should take advantage of demonstrated approaches to 
build stronger social, professional and technological networks with federal agencies and 
with the adjacent state and local agencies in a multi-state region. No longer can one 
expect that by providing pre-defined grant requirements to these agencies that it will 
eventually create an effective network and atmosphere of collaboration. State and local 
law enforcement agencies are very effective at applying resources towards fighting crime. 
Strategically applied, these resources could be equally effective in detecting and 
preventing terrorism. Former International Association of Chiefs of Police President Bill 
Berger pointed this out in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee: 
The role of state and local law enforcement agencies is not limited to 
responding to terrorist attacks. These agencies can and must also play a 
vital role in investigating and preventing future attacks. The 16,000 state 
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and local law enforcement agencies in the United States—and the 700,000 
officers they employ—patrol the streets of our cities and towns daily and, 
as a result, have an intimate knowledge of those communities they serve. 
They have developed strong and close relationships in those communities. 
This unique relationship provides these agencies with a tremendous edge 
in effectively tracking down information related to terrorists. In addition, 
police officers on everyday patrol, making traffic stops, answering calls 
for service, performing community policing activities, and interacting with 
citizens can, if properly trained in what to look for and what questions to 
ask, become a tremendous source of intelligence for their state and federal 
homeland security counterparts.28 [emphasis added] 
B. SOFT SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 
Examination of programs within this thesis requires more than simply looking at 
systems of well-defined technical or structural applications to problems. Such systems are 
used for ensuring that agencies have both the money and equipment and that the 
equipment is interoperable so that agencies can work together, but often there is give 
little consideration given to social, political and cultural aspects that influence how 
people interact. This thesis will use a Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) to identify 
existing problems and develop a conceptual model that has potential for positively 
influencing the human factors that affect how independent organizations can come 
together effectively to target common problems.  
1. Win-Win: SSM can Portray the Complexities of Effective 
Cooperation 
The paper will use SSM to explore how federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies may be successfully influenced to cooperate in achieving common goals of 
prevention and protection against terrorist attacks. Additionally, it will explore what 
designs might influence these agencies to participate collaboratively in an effective 
manner with consideration for flexibility and accountability. Too often, collaborative and 
cooperative agency participation has tried and failed through federal grant programs and 
                                                 
28 International Association of Chiefs of Police, “IACP Testifies on Local Law Enforcement Role in 
Homeland Defense,” International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
http://iacp.org/documents/index.cfm?document_id=203&document_type_id=10&fuseaction=document 
(accessed August 5, 2008). 
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systems that are designed as a template with various compliance requirements—
unfortunately with less consideration for the unique work environments that exist in 
various agencies, as well as in areas of a state, region or the nation. 
In many cases, measures of accountability are determined by “experts” outside the 
area in which the program will be implemented. The designing individuals are often 
detached from the agencies that will carry out a mission and often even lack working 
knowledge of procedures, norms or professional cultures in the surrounding environment. 
Without having local information and perspective, the program designers must speculate 
on what is needed to achieve cooperation and produce a successful outcome. They may 
expect that overall conditions and circumstances will be uniform throughout the country. 
This is not the case, and it causes multiple implementation problems which continue to 
occur. This examination through SSM may provide future opportunities to consider local 
processes, professional relationships and unique agency needs when developing federal 
homeland security programs that intend to invite state and local law enforcement 
participation.   
2. Choice of Design in Complex Human Situations—What will Really 
Work? 
What one thinks of as ‘engineering’ begins when a need is established; and the 
engineer’s task is to provide something which literally meets the need, whether in the 
form of physical object or a procedure, or both. The best engineer is the one who 
provides with a minimum of resources a solution which both works and is aesthetically 
pleasing.29 In order to use SSM, it’s important to understand what it is and appreciate the 
distinction between soft and hard systems thinking. First, let’s look at systems 
engineering (SE). Peter Checkland (a pioneer in SSM) gives this description: 
Systems Engineering is a process of naming a system (assumed to be some 
complex object which exists or could exist in the real world), defining its 
objectives, and then using an array of techniques developed in the 1950s 
and 1960s to engineer the system to meet its objectives. This framework  
                                                 
29 Peter Checkland, Soft Systems Methodology: A 30-Year Retrospective (West Sussex: John Wiley 
and Sons Ltd., 1999), 17. 
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was rapidly found to be poverty-stricken when faced with the complexity 
of human situations. It was too thin, not rich enough to deal with fizzing 
social complexity.30 
SE ignores worldviews and considers systems as things in the world that have 
very specific structure and objectives that can be engineered. SSM, on the other hand, 
allows acceptance of worldviews in a learning process that can define desirable and 
feasible actions to improve the considered problem situation. A hard system thinking 
views the world as interacting systems that can be engineered to achieve an objective. It 
does not consider the potential for conflicting worldviews that are part of social 
interaction.31  According to Peter Checkland, “In SSM the (social world) is taken to be 
very complex, problematical, mysterious, and characterized by clashes of worldview.”32 
 
Illustration based on Peter Checkland, Soft Systems Methodology: a 30-Year Retrospective 
Figure 1.   Soft Systems vs. Hard Systems 
                                                 
30Peter Checkland and John Poulter, Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account of Soft Systems 
Methodology and Its Use for Practitioners, Teachers and Students (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 
2006). 17. 
31 Ibid. 21 
32 Ibid. 22. 
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The observer with a hard systems view of a problem will see systems that he can 
engineer. While an observer using a soft systems approach can look at problems that 
seem complex and confusing and organize its exploration as a learning system.33  
SSM looks beyond the surface and examines what may be inhibiting successful 
management of a project or program. As example, state and local representatives have 
been brought together from around the country to address the critical need to include state 
and local agencies in federal homeland security efforts, but an important question arises: 
Is including a few state and local representatives on a federal program planning 
committee from separated areas of the country as effective as having state and local 
representation from the actual areas that will be working together?34 This question will be 
examined through evaluation of successful models that have worked for addressing 
similar issues. 
3. Understanding the Full Nature of the Challenge: People and Practices 
Achieving end goals for a specific national homeland security program should 
require an understanding of how agency administrators and field level officers interact 
within local communities, states and geographic regions of the country. Although there 
are common laws, policies and procedures to guide law enforcement agencies throughout 
the country, cultures and practices have developed that are often dissimilar. Vitally 
important is the consideration of the cultures that exist within specific law enforcement 
communities and an understanding of how an agency’s relationships have evolved. It is 
important to note that there is not one single organizational culture for all police. The 
style of policing in any community can be affected by a mixture of values and attitudes in 
the community.35 Individual personalities of agency leaders can also influence the 
potential for successful interagency collaborative programs.  
                                                 
33 Checkland, Soft Systems Methodology, A11. 
34 Yim, National Preparedness, 8-11. 
35Stephen J. Harrison, “Police Organizational Culture: Using Ingrained Values to Build Positive 
Organizational Improvement,” Public Administration and Management: An Interactive Journal 3, no. 2, 
http://www.pamij.com/harrison.html (accessed August 6, 2008).  
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With these considerations in mind, this thesis uses SSM to identify human 
situations in which people can take purposeful action which is meaningful for them 
and apply it to well-defined objectives.36 SSM is a qualitative technique that can apply 
systems thinking to non-systemic situations. It provides a means of addressing program 
or situational ineffectiveness that may be influenced by social, political and human 
activity. This is what distinguishes SSM from other methodologies which are more suited 
to deal with hard problems that may often be technology oriented.37 In addition, Soft 
Systems Methodology is ideally suited for use in situations where it is necessary to 
determine obstacles to a program’s success. SSM is suitable for this thesis because of its 
potential for identifying a way of creating a paradigm shift from ‘top-down’ driven 
federal mandates to a ‘bottom-up’ design for state and local law enforcement homeland 
security applications. Peter Checkland and his colleagues at Lancaster University 
developed SSM in the 1960s and early on identified seven steps to the SSM process (see 
Figure 2): 
1. Investigate the unstructured problem. 
2. Express the problem through worldviews of the key stakeholders. This 
involves creating rich pictures with information relating to the problem 
situation. 
3. Create and examine root definitions of relevant systems. 
4. Make and test conceptual models based upon worldviews. 
5. Compare conceptual models with the problem situation. 
6. Identify feasible and desirable changes. 
7. Take action to improve the problem situation. 
 
                                                 
36 Checkland, Soft Systems, A7. 
37 Peter Weeks, “Applying Systems Thinking to Non-systemic Situations: Explanations of Soft 
Systems Methodology of Checkland,” 12 Manage Fast Track, 
http://www.12manage.com/methods_checkland_soft_systems_methodology.html (accessed July 16, 2008). 
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Figure 2.   Soft Systems Methodology 
When dealing with real-life problems involving human beings one must have 
flexibility. People’s decisions will be influenced by many factors including their 
personalities, upbringing, education, sense of pride, age, gender etc. In the human world, 
no situation ever plays out exactly the same. There can be many influences affecting 
problematical human situations. These situations can evolve and be perceived differently 
by the various people that are involved. According to Checkland, “SSM provides a set of 
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principles which can be both adopted and adapted for use in any real situation in which 
people are intent on taking action to improve it.”38 Developing a rich picture of the 
problem involves looking at it from a wide range of aspects. Checkland points out, “In 
making a rich picture the aim is to capture, informally, the main entities, structures and 
viewpoints in the situation, the processes going on, the current recognized issues and any 
potential ones.”39 
In 1990, Checkland provided an updated option to use only four steps, which 
represented a more flexible use of SSM: 
1. Find out about a problem situation, including culturally and 
politically. 
2. Formulate some relevant purposeful activity models. 
3. Debate the situation using models and seek from that debate both: 
a. Changes which would improve the situation and are 
regarded as both desirable and culturally feasible, and 
b. The accommodations between conflicting interests which 
will enable action-to-improve to be undertaken 
4. Take action in the situation to bring about improvement40 
SSM can be very versatile and has wide application by allowing learning to take 
place when proceeding through examination of problematical situations towards an action 
to improve them. Its flexibility also allows for considerations and comparisons during 
research that can provide problem-solving insight that leads to defining a purposeful 
course of action. Instead of the classic way of doing research—in setting up a hypothesis 
and conducting experiments to test it—does not readily apply to the social and human 
situations that widely affect groups and organizations. Human situations are diverse, 
change through time and have conflicting world views (particularly in the case of 
                                                 
38 Checkland and Poulter, Learning for Action, 6. 
39 Ibid., 25. 
40 Ibid., A-15. 
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homeland security: taking place across a large nation with such diverse population and  
geographical areas as the U.S.). SSM provides an opportunity to conduct action research 
by considering human situations, activity and experiences as the research object itself 
(see Figure 3).41 
 
Figure 3.   SSM Investigation 
SSM methodology is used in this thesis to examine the current disconnects in 
federal, state, local and tribal homeland security efforts and seeks to identify an improved 
method for successfully stimulating information sharing, cooperation and collaboration 
among these law enforcement agencies. It examines established models that are already 
in effect and uses them as a basis for developing a conceptual homeland security 
application. The research cited here considers the human factors in proven, non-
homeland security concepts that are used for delivering collaborative, goal-oriented 
federal, state and local law enforcement services.  
This thesis follows the methodology described in this chapter and uses it as a tool 
for identifying the existing problems that fail to successfully prevent and protect and 
often discourages collaboration between federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies. SSM allows comparison and consideration of effective models that may have 
application if used for homeland security purposes. Chapters IV and V provide specific 
insights about the strengths and weaknesses of proven, working, collaborative models 
that interdict another national threat: the drug trade through the Rocky Mountain corridor. 
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The thesis will culminate by proposing a new, conceptual model in Chapter VI, with 
suggestions for improved methods for applying combined multi-agency resources 
towards detecting and preventing terrorism in the United States.  
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IV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG 
TRAFFICKING AREA MODEL (RMHIDTA) 
A. THE HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA (HIDTA) 
NATIONAL PROGRAM 
This chapter examines the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and 
then more specifically the Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(RMHIDTA) program. The HIDTA program was established in 1988, under the direction 
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) through the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988.42  This program was designed to infuse federal resources with state and 
local drug enforcement efforts. This targeted, cooperative and coordinated effort provides 
great opportunity for law enforcement teams to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking 
organizations.  HIDTA is credited with success because of its proven ability to break 
down the longstanding barriers between the state, local and federal law enforcement 
agencies. Each HIDTA is governed by its own executive comprised of sixteen 
members—eight federal members and eight state and local members. These boards 
facilitate interagency drug control efforts to eliminate or reduce drug threats. 43  The 
executive boards develop the specific strategies to address local and regional threats. 
They ensure that initiatives are developed, employed, supported and evaluated on a 
regular and consistent basis. These executive boards can work very well.  
This cross-representation and diversification generally lends itself to a strong 
spirit of cooperation with less competitive distractions. In 1990, the HIDTA program 
received Congressional appropriation for $25 million. It has authorized appropriations for 
$260 million for fiscal year 2009.44 The major leap in funding is due to the program 
                                                 
42 Weeks, “Applying Systems Thinking to Non-systemic Situations. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Title III-High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas,” White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/HIDTA/statute.html 
(accessed July 12, 2008). 
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expanding rapidly because of its long-term, proven track record of success.  That is why 
this program has been selected as a model example of effective intra-agency cooperation. 
HIDTAs are present in 45 states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the 
District of Columbia. Each HIDTA represents a geographical region and there are 28 




Figure 4.   High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) 
B. A MAJOR REASON FOR SUCCESS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
PROCESSES 
Performance management is an essential process in effectively monitoring a 
program such as HIDTA, and it is important to note who cultivated HIDTA’s 
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accountability process. In 2003, a group of HIDTA directors worked together and 
developed the program’s Performance Management Process (PMP). The PMP documents 
how well each individual HIDTA annually fulfilled its commitments to ONDCP. Each of 
the HIDTAs is required to outline certain performance goals that each intends to achieve. 
The PMP provides a set of standardized tables that capture key data accumulated 
throughout the year.45 ONDCP cites the following performance measures as part of the 
HIDTA program PMP:  
• The principal performance objective—disruption and dismantlement of drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs)—is a reasonable proxy for reducing the supply of 
drugs in the United States.  
• The PMP focuses on the common features of what HIDTAs actually try to do (again, 
disrupt and dismantle DTOs) and not on measures the HIDTAs can only indirectly 
affect; e.g., drug-related assaults.  
• The PMP is flexible enough to be used for HIDTAs with very different strategies, 
including those that attempt to disrupt smuggling operations along the southwest 
border, methamphetamine production in the Central Valley of California, marijuana 
cultivation in Appalachia or money laundering wherever it occurs.  
• It is easily understood—“Tell me what you said you were going to achieve and then 
tell me what you did achieve.” 46 
Individual HIDTA funding levels are based on their performance. Superior 
performance and accomplishments are recognized with continued funding at levels that 
support demonstrated operational needs. The HIDTAs have developed in a way that has 
gone far beyond the benefits to the local initiatives. Information sharing and coordinated 
efforts have effectively tied together law enforcement and task force operations throughout states, 
regions and even across the country. 
C. A SPECIFIC PROGRAM FOR STUDY: ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIDTA 
Examining the Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(RMHIDTA) provides an opportunity to consider facets of a multi-agency program 
operating in a large geographic region. Chapter VI specifically considers which aspects 
                                                 
45 Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Title III-High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas.” 
46 Ibid. 
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of RMHIDTA may have application in a homeland security mission. RMHIDTA was 
formed in 1996 creating a region representing law enforcement agencies from Colorado, 
Wyoming and Utah. Five counties from Montana were added in 2002 (see Figure 5). 
RMHIDTA represents the state police agencies from each of the four participating states 
and includes municipal and county law enforcement agencies from thirty-four counties in 
the region.  It encompasses areas from major metropolitan cities to very rural stretches 
that have a sparse law enforcement presence.47   
RMHIDTA is designed to include participation in its initiatives by federal, state 
and local law enforcement agencies working in a fully cooperative environment. It is a 
program and not a government organization. All involved personnel participating in the 
program’s initiatives remain employees of their individual agencies.  
There are currently 115 different federal, state and local agencies; 495 full-time 
personnel; and 1,244 part-time personnel affiliated with the program and most of these 
are sworn, law enforcement personnel. These officers and support staff are involved in 
thirty-three different initiatives that are networked and supported through RMHIDTA.48  
                                                 
47 Document was provided to author by Thomas Gorman, Director of the Rocky Mountain High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA); Rocky Mountain HIDTA, “Rocky Mountain HIDTA On-Site 
Review November 1 ─ 5, 2004,” (internal document Rocky Mountain HIDTA, Denver, Colorado, February 
15, 2005), 1. 
48 Ibid., 8. 
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Figure 5.   Map of Rocky Mountain HIDTA (RMHIDTA) 
1. RMHIDTA Organizational Design 
a. Strategic Mission and Objectives 
The original mission of the RMHIDTA was to enhance cooperative efforts 
in reducing the availability of illicit drugs within the region and nationally.  
The mission has evolved and the current mission states:  
The mission of the Rocky Mountain HIDTA is to support the national 
drug control strategy of reducing drug use. Specifically, the Rocky 
Mountain HIDTA’s ultimate mission is to facilitate cooperation and 
coordination among federal, state and local drug enforcement efforts to 
enhance combating the drug trafficking problem locally, regionally and 
nationally. This mission is accomplished through intelligence-driven joint 
multi-agency collocated drug task forces sharing information and working 
cooperatively with other drug enforcement initiatives including 
interdiction. The aim is to reduce drug availability by eliminating or 
disrupting drug trafficking organizations and to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of law enforcement organizations in their efforts within 
HIDTA.49 
                                                 
49 Document provided to author by Thomas Gorman, Director of the Rocky Mountain HIDTA; 
“Rocky Mountain HIDTA 2007 Annual Report,” (internal document, Rocky Mountain HIDTA, Denver, 
Colorado, n.d.), 6. 
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b. Communication Lines of Authority 
(1) Executive Board: The program is then administered by an 
executive board that is comprised of twenty-four members and is guided by established 
policies and procedures. Ten members are lead federal agency administrators who are 
assigned within the geographic boundaries of RMHIDTA. There are fourteen state and 
local representatives with at least one state and one local agency representative from each 
state. These members are senior-level administrators from their respective agencies and 
the board meets at least quarterly.50  
The executive board has an elected chairperson and vice-chairperson. The 
chairperson serves for one year and this position alternates between a 
federal and state or local representative. The chairperson acts in a similar 
fashion as a chairperson of a corporate board of directors and the 
executive board the same as a corporate board.  
The executive board also selects a qualified individual to serve as the 
director of RMHIDTA. The director reports to the executive board and 
also liaisons with the President’s Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP).  
There are five standing sub-committees comprised of members of the 
executive board. The five sub-committees that provide oversight are:  
• Intelligence 
• Strategic Planning 
• Budget 
• Training Advisory 
• Compliance 
(2) State Committees: Additionally, there is a state committee for 
Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and Montana. The state committees are responsible for 
overseeing issues related to the taskforces that operate within their specific state. It is  
 
                                                 
50 Document provided to author by Thomas Gorman, Director of the Rocky Mountain HIDTA; 
“Rocky Mountain HIDTA 2007 Annual Report,” (internal document, Rocky Mountain HIDTA, Denver, 
Colorado, n.d.), 3-4. 
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important to note that they attempt to manage performance issues prior to being taken to 
the entire executive board, which increases accountability, responsibility and efficiency 
to the overall program.51   
2. RMHIDTA Operational Design 
THE RMHIDTA facility is located in Denver, Colorado. The office space is 
leased and has room for daily operations and regional coordination. The central 
Investigative Support Center (ISC) is located there as well and facilitates a clearinghouse 
of information and data from all of the cooperating agencies and other available 
resources. 
The board travels to the RMHIDTA office to physically convene on a quarterly 
basis and the chairperson more often, if needed.  The director handles the day-to-day 
operations and supervises the management team that is responsible for the administrative 
function of the program.   
The management staff is streamlined and very efficient. For example, there is no 
need for a deputy director, although other HIDTAs around the country do utilize a deputy 
director position.52  There is one fiscal manager, a budget officer and an executive 
secretary, as well as intelligence analysts. 
Having a centralized, day-to-day operation ensures that the necessary 
communication with all of the project and initiatives and board members takes place in a 
consistent manner and creates a central point for program guidance 
3. Data Gathering  
The RMHIDTA has developed a strategy for addressing the drug problems in the 
region that is based on the threats, personnel resources, fiscal resources and past 
performance. They have been very effective by having existing taskforces modify their 
                                                 
51 “Rocky Mountain HIDTA On-Site Review,” 4. 
52 Document provided to author by Thomas Gorman, Director of the Rocky Mountain HIDTA; 
“Rocky Mountain HIDTA Policy and Procedure Manual,” (internal document, Rocky Mountain HIDTA, 
Denver, Colorado, n.d.), 3-9. 
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focus to meet changing threats. The executive board and director keep personnel and 
resources targeted at the most significant threats facing the communities in the region.53  
Threat assessments are produced by the National Drug Intelligence Center. It 
obtains information from law enforcement agency’s responses to the National Drug 
Threat Survey and interviews with drug unit commanders and gathers information from 
emergency admissions and treatment programs.54 A threat assessment was conducted 
when the RMHIDTA was established in 1996. Per policy, a threat assessment is 
conducted annually with input from all of the initiatives participating in the program. The 
initiatives represent the various taskforces and units that receive HIDTA funding. The 
threat assessments center on the drug trade and the gang violence that is associated with 
it. 
Officers on duty from all participating multi-agency task forces report real-time 
not only to their own departments but also to the Investigative Support Center (ISC).  
Reports, notifications and electronic data transfers are also given to the analysts for a 
broader perspective, enabling them to observe trends and disseminate intelligence to all 
of the regional participants. 
4. Information and Intelligence Sharing 
A prime component of the RMHIDTA is its Intelligence Sub-System. This is 
managed and coordinated through the ISC. The RMHIDTA ISC is located in Denver, 
Colorado. There is a satellite ISC in Salt Lake City, Utah and a Criminal Intelligence 
Team in Cheyenne, Wyoming. These units are part of the overall strategy and 
intelligence initiative. The 2005 ONDCP On-site Review indicated, at the time, there was 
limited coordination between these units and recommended that RMHIDTA develop 
better methods of coordination.55  
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One model worthy of review as a super-effective intelligence sharing platform is 
the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), which was designed to collect and disseminate 
information relating to drug, alien and weapon smuggling in support of field enforcement 
entities throughout the Southwest region. EPIC began as an entity to monitor and 
interdict the drug trade through Mexico, but now effectively gathers from and 
disseminates information to federal agencies, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, 
Canada, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam, in addition to supporting law 
enforcement efforts conducted by foreign counterparts throughout the world. After 9/11 
in response to increased multiagency needs, EPIC developed into a fully coordinated, 
tactical intelligence center supported by databases and resources from member agencies.  
The ISCs within RMHIDTA have sought to learn from EPIC and coordinate 
efforts and intelligence in a similar fashion, including budgeting. The three state units are 
all part of one intelligence initiative. The executive board, director and taskforce 
commanders have all demonstrated additional committed support for these intelligence 
units. There are thirteen analytical positions assigned to this initiative. The ISC has 
implemented an Investigative Analyst Training and Development Assessment process to 
ensure that personnel are able to increase their skill level and expertise.56  
The 2005 ONDCP On-site Review Report highlighted some significant findings 
that help describe the program and its effectiveness. It noted that the taskforces of 
RMHIDTA are attentive to local and regional drug trafficking patterns while being 
significantly involved in cases that are tied into other parts of the country. According to a 
2004 ONDCP RMHIDTA On-Site Review, “Such a network of enforcement activity, 
along with its intelligence collection and sharing emphasis, allows RMHIDTA to state 
that it is progressing toward achieving its mission.”57  This review also mentioned that 
historically federal resources and personnel are not particularly prevalent or welcomed in 
the law enforcement culture of this region. It cites this skepticism for federal presence as 
an even more remarkable consideration in the success that RMHIDTA has achieved in 
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bringing forth interagency cooperation and coordination.58 The RMHIDTA genuinely 
promotes a collegial concept among the agencies through its representation on the 
executive board. It has been very successful in leveraging its federal funding by having 
participating agencies step forward and provide personnel and resources towards the 
initiatives.59  
5. Accountability—Performance & Resource Management 
In 2004, The HIDTA program initiated a performance measurement program to 
assess each HIDTA’s effectiveness and efficiency in impacting illegal drugs. The strategy 
and goals are related to dismantling and disrupting drug trafficking organizations.  The 
RMHIDTA Executive Board, along with the Director evaluates the threat assessments 
and develops the strategy, initiatives, and budgets for the program. They are also 
responsible for ensuring accountability throughout the initiatives and to take appropriate 
action if any aspect fails to perform to the established standards.  
A 2005 ONDCP Review of the RMHIDTA recommended that the executive 
board members “institute a formalized evaluative process event/meeting in order to 
memorialize its decisions concerning its assessment of each initiative’s projected 
production, current level of achievement, existing structure and mission, and 
attentiveness to guidelines.”60 This is accomplished through a process of reviews that 
include: 1) analyzing statistical reports, 2) conducting and analyzing internal review 
reports and 3) budget review committee assessments. On occasion, some of the taskforce 
commanders appear before the board to make presentations. The ONDCP Review also 
noted that the executive board members were very knowledgeable of the HIDTA 
program and concept. The executive board was also recognized for being actively 
involved and providing oversight and direction to the initiative’s personnel. In addition,  
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the review also credited the level of communication that exists between all participants. It 
is through this process that the executive board ensures that HIDTA’s performance based 
budgeting policy is being adhered to. 61 
It is important to understand the value of communication within the 
administration of the RMHIDTA. Internal reviews are a process that facilitates efficiency 
and accountability. These reviews are part of the ONDCP/HIDTA program policy and 
budget guidance requirements. RMHIDTA internal reviews fall under two categories, 
fiscal and operational. The fiscal manager and budget officer make onsite visits to each 
initiative and its fiduciary at least once every two years. Maintaining accountability for 
all purchased equipment by the RMHIDTA is at the forefront of this administrative 
process. Property reconciliations are conducted during these visits, and each initiative is 
required to maintain strict accounting for all property. If assets are no longer needed, the 
individual initiative will make them available to other RMHIDTA partners. Additionally, 
equipment can be borrowed between initiatives on occasion. The intent of these internal 
reviews is to ensure that the director and his staff have a close relationship with each 
initiative commander and thorough understanding of their initiative. They help ensure 
that all are in compliance with HIDTA policies and are meeting the expectations of the 
executive board. Any deficiencies are documented in a report with the corrective action 
outlined and presented to the executive board by the director.62  
Management of the federal funds provided to RMHIDTA is a vital task. It 
involves taking a set amount of funding for the entire regional program and applying it 
where it will have the most influence and effect towards accomplishing the overall goals. 
It takes continuous maintenance and monitoring to ensure that the performance based 
budgeting is being applied appropriately. The current and only director of RMHIDTA has 
a great deal of experience and thorough understanding of narcotics investigations. He is 
very involved in the process for which each initiative submits its annual budget requests  
 
 
                                                 
61 “Rocky Mountain HIDTA On-Site Review,” 3-5. 
62 “Rocky Mountain HIDTA On-Site Review,” 8. 
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and justifications. The director gives guidance to the various taskforce commanders in 
preparing their annual initiative draft proposals. The 2005 ONDCP On-Site Review 
provides information on how the process works: 
There are multiple layers in the budgeting and reprogramming processes 
of RMHIDTA. Initiative/taskforce commanders submit their annual 
initiative proposal directly to the HIDTA director’s office. The director 
and staff review each request and make comments and recommendations 
that are sent to the initiative/taskforce commanders for their rebuttal. The 
original request, director and staff recommendations, as well as the 
rebuttals, are then distributed to the appropriate state budget committee, 
which consists of board members from their respective state. The state 
budget committees meet and come to a final consensus on how they feel 
the money should be distributed to achieve their goals and address the 
threat in that state. The state budget committee recommendations are then 
passed along to the overall Executive Board Budget Sub-Committee. This 
committee is a compilation of the individual state budget committees. 
They also review all prior stages and make a final recommendation to the 
entire executive board. The executive board is the final approval stage 
prior to submission to ONDCP.63 
6. Training 
An important subsystem of RMHIDTA is its training initiative. The training 
program is submitted as a separate initiative each year.  In the RMHIDTA budget in the 
fiscal year 2005, 5.56 percent was dedicated to providing related training to officers 
throughout the region. This reflects the importance of providing significant training 
opportunities in support of the initiatives and the program. All four states have 
representatives on a training sub-committee. They meet annually to select and schedule 
the training for the next year.64  
The training program is very well-run and provides elements of expertise that 
officers can apply directly to their narcotics investigation and interdiction work. The 
training team consists of a full-time training coordinator and two assistant training 
coordinators. The success of this program and its cooperative approach is reflected in 
                                                 
63 “Rocky Mountain HIDTA On-Site Review,” 9-14. 
64 Ibid., 91. 
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how it is coordinated with other training programs and participating agencies. These 
agencies regularly provide instructors.  The training is designed to be timely and  to 
specifically meet the needs of the participating agencies, including officers and analysts. 
The courses provided through RMHIDTA are well-attended. It is a very innovative 
program that complements the cooperative enforcement efforts of the RMHIDTA.65 
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V. THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGHWAY PATROL NETWORK 
The Rocky Mountain Highway Patrol Network (RMHPN) is a joint criminal 
interdiction effort between the state police agencies in Utah, Montana, Wyoming and 
Colorado. It began in March of 2001 when the state police agencies of Utah, Wyoming 
and Colorado entered into a memorandum of understanding to participate in an inter-
agency effort through coordinated RMHIDTA initiatives. These states each had law 
enforcement canine programs and similar operational needs related to criminal drug 
interdiction.  In January of 2005, the Montana Highway Patrol joined the network.   
The collaboration and effectiveness of RMHIDTA inspired the opportunity to 
coordinate the resources of these state law enforcement agencies to create a more 
efficient highway patrol network. The RMHPN has become the original model for the 
rest of the country, and many HIDTAs have now incorporated state police networks. 
A. STRUCTURE AND DESIGN 
1. RMHPN Organizational Design 
a. Strategic Mission and Objectives 
The RMHPN’s main emphasis targets drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) that operate in and throughout the region. The cooperative agreement 
emphasized that the effort is intended to increase communication between the 
participating state police agencies; increase drug trafficking arrest rates; increase 
prosecution and conviction rates for drug traffickers and their organizations and has led 
to other opportunities to interdict criminal activity. This was the first collaborative project 
to link highway patrol agencies for this purpose.66  
                                                 
66 Document provided to author by Thomas Gorman, Director of Rocky Mountain HIDTA; “Rocky 
Mountain Highway Patrol Network Fact Sheet,” (internal document, Rocky Mountain HIDTA, Denver, 
Colorado, January 19, 2006), 1. 
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2. RMHN Operational Design 
The Rocky Mountain Highway Patrol Network is comprised of federal, state and 
local law enforcement agencies from the states of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah and 
Montana. On the state and local side, the executive board consists of chiefs, sheriffs and 
state police commissioners from all four states. The federal members of the board are 
U.S. attorneys and senior agency administrators from within the states and regions 
represented. This group has been very successful in providing guidance and funding to 
the various taskforces and initiatives within RMHIDTA. They have created a working 
environment that promotes cooperation. Regional coordination in drug crime 
investigations and information sharing is a primary objective. The HIDTA program as a 
whole expands the potential to network with law enforcement agencies throughout the 
country.  
Each state police agency has a command-level officer that regularly 
communicates and coordinates with peers from the other agencies. These commanders 
meet quarterly as a guiding committee to coordinate information sharing, training, 
equipment purchases, trends, projects, tactical operations and regional intelligence. These 
commanders follow the overall guidance and directives of the RMHIDTA Executive 
Board and set subsequent RMHPN initiative goals. They are responsible for developing 
strategies for applying these state law enforcement agency’s resources with other state 
and local drug taskforces, as well as working closely with federal agency partners within 
RMHIDTA. This is an effective way of connecting these agencies through established 
channels of communication and coordination.  
3. Data Gathering 
The RMHPN utilizes the ISC for information gathering, basically using the same 
system as the RMHIDTA in that officers collect information to give to their own agencies 
as well as the coordinating office at the ISC in Denver. 
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4. Information and Intelligence Sharing 
Linking criminal activity related to the drug trade that takes place across adjacent 
borders has become very effective in the Rocky Mountain region. The state troopers also 
have secure websites that they have developed for sharing information related to their 
stops. Interdiction officers from local agencies also participate. Information is shared 
regarding trends, methods of concealment, officer safety alerts and considerable amounts 
of other information that increases the effectiveness of all interdiction officers. This 
increases the likelihood that national and international drug trafficking organizations will 
be identified and interdicted as they operate across state lines.  Engaged law enforcement 
officers from each state individually share arrest information in real time with each other 
through these secure, web-based networks. Arrest and intelligence information from all 
four states is shared nationally through a monthly RMHPN bulletin and various national 
information and intelligence systems.  This practice allows all federal, state, tribal and 
local officers and agencies to observe trends and identify possible drug-related activity 
when it is encountered.67   
The RMHPN uses the RMHIDTA Investigative Support Center (ISC) to support 
its information sharing role. Information is shared with all officers in the RMHIDTA 
region and throughout the country through formal and more informal networks. The ISC 
has a dedicated interdiction intelligence analyst that is assigned directly to support the 
RMHPN. The required actions of officers and analysts are established through policies 
and procedures. The involved highway patrol officers from the four states are regularly 
arresting narcotics traffickers and seizing drugs and cash.  State or RMHIDTA taskforce 
investigators assist in the follow-up investigations and secure related evidence in the form 
of pocket trash, hotel and gas receipts, telephone numbers, cell phones, documents etc. 
This evidence can be used to establish connections to other investigations of drug 
trafficking organizations. These officers are then responsible for completing a detailed 
report and immediately sending it to the intelligence analyst at the ISC.  
                                                 
67 Rocky Mountain Highway Patrol Network Fact Sheet, 1; author’s personal knowledge and 
involvement. 
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The intelligence analyst assists the investigators in determining where the drug 
loads originated and where they are destined. When these areas are identified, contact is 
made with the HIDTA and local law enforcement agency or drug taskforce to share 
information. The ISC then sends the information to the Federal Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) so that it can be entered into their database at the El Paso 
Intelligence Center (EPIC).  This is done to connect the drug courier and load to 
investigations that may be taking place in other parts of the country. The intelligence 
analyst has the responsibility to ensure that the information exchange takes place, to 
receive related information and report back to the officers. Additionally, the ISC 
intelligence analyst compiles and publishes a weekly RMHPN intelligence bulletin that is 
available to state, local and federal officers nationwide and in Canada. This bulletin 
contains information from the RMHPN officers regarding activity related to significant 
drug and cash seizures, methods of concealment, officer safety, packaging, routing, 
trends and any other information that could benefit officers within the RMHPN or 
elsewhere. This has resulted in much information being directed back to the analysts and 
officers.68  
5. Accountability—Performance and Resource Management 
The four state police agencies (as a whole) receive federal drug enforcement 
funding to enhance their effectiveness—both individually and collectively. They also 
leverage agency assets to ensure maximum advantage to their program.69  Each agency is 
responsible for managing its individual budgets.  Emphasis is placed on coordinating 
resources and activity to reduce costs and enhance effectiveness. 
For example, when command level officers from each agency assess various 
equipment and training needs to determine the acquisitions most suited for their specific 
applications, they come together to also determine the highest good for the region as a 
                                                 
68 Document provided to author by Thomas Gorman, Director of Rocky Mountain HIDTA; Thomas 
Gorman, 2006 National HIDTA Outstanding Interdiction Effort Award Nomination (internal document, 
National HIDTA Board, n.d.). 
69 Document provided to author by Thomas Gorman, Director of Rocky Mountain HIDTA; Rocky 
Mountain HIDTA, “Rocky Mountain Highway Patrol Network Operating Policy” (internal document, 
Rocky Mountain HIDTA, Denver, Colorado, n.d.). 
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whole, and are able to collectively gain purchasing power by combining resources.  This 
also ensures inter-operability of the systems used between agencies. 
The RMHPN, as one of the RMHIDTA initiatives, is responsible for meeting its 
own performance measurements. Failure to do so can result in reduced funding or 
redirection of resources.  The implementation of these performance measurements has 
enhanced each department’s opportunities to target drug trafficking organizations through 
communication and coordinated regional projects. 
6. Training 
In addition, the committee of command level representatives from each state 
police agency designs training and equipment allocation plans that complement their 
overall interdiction efforts.  Money is spent for specialized training courses where each 
state is able to send its officers.  This high level of training ensures that all officers have 
consistent instruction and operate in a fashion that allows for better coordination on joint 
projects. This consistent training has resulted in fewer complaints and improved case law.   
B. A PROVEN PROGRAM, A PROVEN STRATEGY 
It is easy to see why such a cooperative program as RMHPN will not only 
continue to operate but also continue to receive the level of funding needed for such 
effective operations.  
In 2006, the RMHPN was awarded the National HIDTA Award for Outstanding 
Narcotics Interdiction Unit. The following information highlights the effectiveness of this 
four state interdiction team during that one-year award evaluation period (see Table 1). 
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Table 1.   Narcotics Interdiction 
7,600 lbs of marijuana  501 felony arrests 
754 lbs of cocaine 1.7 million dollars of U.S. currency 
5 lbs of tar heroin $900,000 worth of stolen property 
200 lbs of methamphetamine 18 submachine guns, 11 handguns and 
numerous rifles and shotguns 
17 lbs of ecstasy 145 seized vehicles with 43 containing 
false compartments 
RMHIDTA Director Tom Gorman nominated this team for the award. In his 
nomination, Director Gorman states: 
One of the primary goals of the RMHPN is to tie the interdiction seizures 
into on going investigations throughout the United States. This effort has 
been successful. Annually, the program averages 150 “hand off” cases for 
follow up to HIDTA Task Force or DEA. The follow up has resulted in 
information exchange with 146 agencies where significant loads 
originated, and 139 agencies where significant loads were destined 
involving 34 different states. Evidence discovered during the stops has 
assisted task forces and agencies throughout the country that have targeted 
drug trafficking organizations.70 
RMHPN and RMHIDTA were both highlighted in this thesis specifically for their 
design, structure, success in collaboration and overall effectiveness as best-practice 
examples.  The strengths of these programs and suggestions for improvements have been 
carried forward into the conceptual homeland security model that will be discussed in 
part B of the following chapter. 
                                                 
70 Document provided to author by Thomas Gorman, Director of Mountain HIDTA; Rocky Mountain 
HIDTA, “Director Thomas Gorman’s Nomination of the Rocky Mountain Highway Patrol Network for 
2006 National HIDTA Drug Task Force Award” (internal document, Rocky Mountain HIDTA, Denver, 
Colorado, n.d.). 
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VI. HRSCA: CONCEPTUAL HOMELAND SECURITY MODEL 
This thesis has outlined the importance of change in the way homeland security is 
handled. It has also illustrated some powerful examples of best-practice programs that 
deserve recognition for their ability to create in drug interdiction what has yet to be 
created for homeland security: accountability and widespread cooperation between 
agencies. A summit or meeting of the minds would be critical to develop consensus on 
change.  A model program at least as strong as the one proposed in this chapter would be 
an ideal platform from which to launch change, which facilitates national law 
enforcement cooperation, enhances two-way flow of intelligence and supports the 
maximum use of available resources for effective terrorist suppression and interdiction. 
A. NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
State and local law enforcement agencies have been part of the national homeland 
security effort since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security has emphasized the role of law enforcement as a key element for preventing and 
interdicting terrorist activity throughout the United States.71 Despite progressive efforts, 
the primary means for directing and driving homeland security at the state and local 
levels have been through federal grants with specific guidance and requirements. U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary George Foresman is quoted as saying 
that states should not be judged by how much grant money they have spent or how fast 
they have expended it. Instead, success should be judged by the quality of their programs 
and the extent to which they have supported and improved upon interagency and 
intergovernmental coordination and collaboration throughout the program development 
and implementation process in order to achieve a safer community.72  This conceptual 
model proposes a way to accomplish this goal in a unique fashion that has a structure 
with proven success. 
                                                 
71 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 25. 
72 James M. Thomas, “Testimony before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs,” (January 9, 2007), 1, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/010907Thomas.pdf (accessed March 30, 2009). 
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1. Getting Real with Funding Issues and Effective Solutions 
Although federal grant requirements have emphasized interoperability and 
cooperation, the method of delivery may have resulted in many cases where agencies 
obtained funding for resources that primarily benefit uses other than collaborative 
counterterrorism efforts. William Jenkins, the Government Accounting Office’s (GAO) 
Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues stated, “We still know little about how 
states have used federal funds to build their capabilities or reduce risks.”73 There remains 
a need to create a method of delivering federal homeland security funding in a way that is 
measured and allows individual state and local law enforcement agencies to participate 
cooperatively in the project’s design and is directed towards realistic attainable goals that 
can be accounted for. These agencies are best suited to develop programs and projects in 
a manner that is tied to their existing working environments and based on realistic 
circumstances that they understand best. There are effective ways to create local, state 
and regional cooperative inter-agency working environments.  Such a design can lead to 
more accountability and measured success. Existing models used for other law 
enforcement missions have presented several positive features that can directly translate 
into homeland security applications. It is possible that hybrid variations may be viable, 
especially in creating a more effective information sharing network. 
2. Creating Win-Win Communication Through Win-Win Programs and 
Nationally Consistent Priorities 
All state and local law enforcement agencies will not view opportunities to 
contribute to the national homeland security effort in the same way. Each agency is 
administered by command staffs that hold varying viewpoints and historical perspectives, 
yet they hold in common certain interests and capabilities. There is much public safety 
benefit available through cooperative working environments. As example, the command 
staff of the Denver, Colorado Police Department (Denver P.D.) may have different 
homeland security priorities, considerations, approaches and perspectives than their 
counterparts in the Salt Lake City, Utah Police Department (SLCPD), yet both have in 
                                                 
73 Strohm, “Appropriators Urge DHS to See if Grants are Improving Security.” 
 59
common incidents and responsibilities that can benefit each through regular sharing 
information. Once the available federal information is included, then that shared 
information allows these agencies to achieve situational awareness within their state and 
at a regional level. It also creates opportunities for developing best practices and offering 
mutual aid. The SLCPD has worked and continues to work with the Utah Department of 
Public Safety (Utah DPS) on projects of mutual benefit, including an Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) and the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. Denver P.D. has a 
similar working relationship with the divisions of the Colorado Department of Public 
Safety and most recently provided safety and security to the city during the 2008 
Democratic National Convention.  
These state public safety agencies operate their state information fusion centers 
for the benefit of all agencies in their state. Relationships between the state fusion centers 
and the local and federal agencies are generally established and ripe for further 
development under a collaborative construct. Additionally, the various state and local 
police agencies of Utah and Colorado participate with their counterparts in the Rocky 
Mountain States as part of a regional approach to specifically targeting drug crime 
reduction in the HIDTA program. These agencies are brought together in a significantly 
non-competitive atmosphere of cooperation. Creating win-win situations is prominent. 
The common theme becomes regional information sharing and collaborations. These 
commonalities between agencies from adjacent states open doors for relationship 
building and in developing effective ways of managing specific problems that benefit all 
of the involved agencies at a regional level.  
Such an environment allows for improved internal and external efficiency of 
operation. Such collaborations are not often possible when federally funded programs are 
presented in a one size fits all manner. State and local police agencies need to be a part of 
the design and goal setting process. This creates buy-in and allows them to leverage their 
existing resources, capabilities, interagency relationships and then apply them to a 
homeland security mission within their geographic area of responsibility.  
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3. Inter-Agency Cooperation on all Levels is Paramount 
Operating as part of a regional team approach with federal agency participation 
creates opportunities for all involved agencies to be involved in the specific design, 
implementation and management of the interagency program or project. This will 
increase opportunities for focused and long-term success.  A program template that is 
solely designed by a federal agency without benefit of direct state and local input from 
the officials who are in the specific areas that it will be implemented, significantly lacks 
information and insight that can lead to long-term success. Having random state and local 
representatives on a DHS program committee has value for creating general national 
guidelines. To have that program fit each state and region in an effective manner requires 
federal, state and local representatives who reside in the region to participate 
collaboratively in the design and management.  Each state and geographical region of the 
country has special circumstances and pre-existing relationships that need to be exploited 
when developing realistic and long-term methods of delivering homeland security 
services at the state and local levels.   
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
are not structured to best design a homeland security program or project for state and 
local law enforcement agencies to participate in. The federal agencies need to contribute 
to state, local and regional homeland security projects, but their main strategic 
contributions should come from representatives who are locally assigned and 
understanding of the interagency cultures, resources and capabilities that exist. The same 
would hold true that a state police department is not best suited to effectively design a 
program for addressing a specific crime problem within a city’s jurisdiction.  
The agency closest to the problem is best informed and positioned to understand 
what is needed. If placed in a collaborative and non-competitive environment, the 
additional resources made available from the federal, state and adjacent local agencies 
can be applied to addressing specific public safety issue which may carry over into other 
jurisdictions. This approach helps prevent the problem from simply migrating to another 
jurisdiction as pressure is applied by one agency independently, and it helps create a  
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situational awareness for all involved. There are many crimes and potential terrorist 
affiliations that may overlap jurisdictional boundaries or be large enough that the local 
agency will need other agency’s assistance.  
The local police department will intimately know its population, geography, 
resources and capabilities. Yet, in a working environment that facilitates communication 
and cooperation, the federal, state and other adjacent local agencies can come together 
and help design a project that responds to the specific problem in a manner that is not 
effectively possible by the local agency itself. This allows the resources and expertise 
available from all agencies to act as a force multiplier. The resulting product benefits 
each agency’s missions and performance of the required tasks is achieved with higher 
efficiency.  
The public benefits when all agencies are able to maintain more safe and secure 
jurisdictional environments. This cannot be accomplished through forced collaborations 
and broad mandates. It must be created through effective communication, evaluation of 
specific intelligence and the careful designing of the project by representatives of the 
involved agencies. The closer they are to the problem, the clearer they can see it. 
The following example is used to emphasize the importance for the potential of a 
successful federal, state and local homeland security program that it be created in a 
manner that promotes cooperation in a shared power and shared responsibility way.  
Individual state and local resources need to be applied in a manner that focuses on 
common goals and that complement federal goals and efforts. As an example, the Utah 
Department of Public Safety participates in federal highway safety grants that are 
administered in a manner that allows state and local highway safety stakeholders to 
deliver programs in a common geographical area.  These complement each other and are 
largely not competitive. Sometimes the projects are in full cooperation, such as a 
cooperative DUI checkpoint manned by multiple agencies, and other times they involve a 
coordinated effort such as a high-visibility statewide media and enforcement campaign to 
encourage seatbelt usage.  
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Homeland security must be approached in a manner that connects federal, state 
and local law enforcement agencies in a similar complementary method, one that 
provides opportunity for state and local agencies to craft a homeland security product that 
works in close conjunction with all allied agencies and reduces the sense of competition. 
It needs to be done in a manner that provides sustainable returns in the form of common 
equipment, training, coordinated projects, improved information sharing and trusted 
relationships. 
4. First Things First: Coming Together 
A first step towards coordination should involve a summit meeting of all of the 
state police commanders and state homeland security directors of the United States.  It is 
realistic that these state agency leaders can come together with their federal partners for a 
meeting of the minds. This group is empowered and manageable enough in size to have 
the potential to enter into agreements that can result in improved information sharing and 
connectivity between each state’s information fusion centers. Development of common 
information-sharing systems that serve each state’s fusion centers individually and 
collectively, while tying into the federal systems, must be identified.  
This platform is needed to develop successful regional homeland security 
components. Such a state-to-state interconnected system would be able to more 
efficiently partner with the federal agencies and complement their databases.  The 
concept requires agreements that provide clarity in developing common data information 
sharing systems that allow information from field officers to reach points that have global 
perspective. It is envisioned that such a system would satisfy the needs of each host state, 
yet be networked in real-time with the other participating states regionally and nationally.   
Instead of having one central repository for all homeland security information, a 
system can be designed to index information and direct queries to state’s that have 
relevant information that is available.  Each state continues to operate databases in 
compliance with its own laws and procedures, but the linked intrastate information can be 
shared with other legitimate law enforcement agencies throughout the country via a state 
to state processes. Ideally, each state, local and tribal police agency needs to be linked to 
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their state fusion center for two-way sharing of information and intelligence. Fusion 
centers can then be directly linked to each other and significantly increase law 
enforcement opportunities to identify criminal and terrorist activity that transcends 
jurisdictions.  The end goal should be that each state has compatible systems that allow 
for real-time sharing of information among all state police managed fusion centers. 
5. Remembering the Vital Importance of Training Consistency & 
Excellence 
Relevant homeland security-related training for state and local law enforcement 
officers is another overlooked and greatly needed resource. Intelligence led police 
training is vital along with other homeland security strategic and tactical applications. 
State and local police officers are well-trained in many facets of law enforcement 
specialties.   
One poignant example would be a patrol officer who has minimum opportunity 
for success in driving under the influence arrests if he is not familiar with the indicators 
of impaired driving.  Another is drug interdiction training. As described in previous 
chapters, state and local law enforcement have been very successful in developing 
training for their officers that is reflective of circumstances that they might encounter 
while on duty.  
Providing comprehensive and up-to-date homeland security-related training to all 
state and local police agencies is imperative to successful terrorist interdiction.  The more 
intelligence that is provided, along with training, will allow more officers the opportunity 
to realize and identify terrorist threats that may be encountered as part of their regular law 
enforcement duties.  Sharing successful terrorist interdiction information among officers 
around the country would not only foster a greater appreciation for the threats, but 
underline their imperative role in prevention. 
B. CONCEPTUAL NATIONAL MODEL 
In previous chapters, the thesis examined the following programs: National High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and its regional sub-components, the Rocky 
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Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (RMHIDTA) and Rocky Mountain 
Highway Patrol Network (RMHPN).  From these examinations, a conceptual model can 
be developed for improving communication, cooperation and effectiveness of homeland 
security related services by federal, state and local agencies.  These models, used as a 
guide for developing this conceptual model, will build infinitely more involved and 
effective state and local homeland security strategies. The emphasis will be on improving 
the awareness and participation of state and local law enforcement agencies while 
providing cooperative focus and accountability for individual projects.  
This national model program, Homeland Security Regional Cooperation Areas 
(HSRCA’s), will be designed to enhance the investigative and preventive measures that 
can be applied through increased state and local participation. It is not necessarily a 
threat-based program, although national and regional threats must be incorporated. Much 
of the threat-based initiatives are addressed through the current State Homeland Security 
Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiatives.  
This concept involves a prevention program that will maximize the potential for 
protecting the public by increasing the amount of information and intelligence made 
available to and from state and local officers. It will increase the expertise of these 
officers and reap benefits from increased amounts of homeland security related 
information being gleaned from their contacts and investigations.  The overarching goal 
is to create a regional approach to homeland security that can be individualized, yet 
duplicated in other connecting regions of the country. These regions will be tied together 
in a national network with their federal agency partners. 
To begin the process, a foundational structure was outlined that served as the 
platform for building a robust state and local law enforcement homeland security 
capability. In emphasizing the need for more ground-up verses a top down approach to 
addressing the problems identified in Chapter I, elements of the National HIDTA Model, 
which was outlined in Chapter IV, were used to develop this concept. 
Congress should establish and fund within the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), a national program with regional components that can be designed for 
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the purpose of more effectively and efficiently incorporating state and local law 
enforcement agencies into the national homeland security mission. This should be done 
in a manner that ensures the responsible use of federal funding without requiring a direct 
relationship with any federal agency. This means that although federal funding is used, 
the regional team will not simply operate to satisfy pre-determined federal mandates. The 
federal relationship for designing regional programs will instead come from local 
representatives who participate as equal members with state and local agencies as part of 
a collaborative team (see Figure 6).   
 
 
Figure 6.   HSRCA Proposed Organizational Chart 
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The purpose of this conceptual program is to reduce the opportunities for terrorist 
individuals and organizations to operate undetected and unchallenged within the borders 
of the United States by: 
1. Facilitating cooperation among federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies to share information, resources and implement coordinated 
enforcement activities through collaborative design. 
2. Enhancing the flow of homeland security related information to and from 
state and local law enforcement officers and increasing law enforcement 
intelligence sharing among federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies. 
3. Providing reliable law enforcement intelligence to law enforcement 
agencies for the purpose of designing effective collaborative enforcement 
strategies and operations. 
4. Supporting coordinated law enforcement strategies which maximize use of 
available resources to detect disrupt and apprehend individuals and/or 
organizations that are reasonably suspected of being linked to terrorism in 
real-time in order to be able to make critical arrests within appropriate 
timeframes. 
The Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the governors of each state, should 
implement this program by designating specific regions of the country as HSRCA’s. The 
Secretary will appoint a director within DHS to administer the program. Once the 
regional HSRCA’s are identified, the director shall: 
1. Establish a panel of qualified experts with state and local police 
representation to determine national goals and objectives to guide the 
regional programs and ensure that they may be adequately networked. 
2. Create regulations under which a coalition of law enforcement agencies 
from a region may prepare proposals for how their specific programs will 
operate.  
3. Establish and maintain overall program performance measures while 
allowing regional enhancements. 
4. Obligate specific amounts of the appropriated funding to the individual 
HSRCA regions based on the overall merit, creativity, viability, 
cooperative value of their plans and the upfront state and local 
contributions.  
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5. Ensure that federal assistance and support is made available as needed to 
each region.  
6. Coordinate administrative, records keeping and funds management with 
state and local agencies. 
7. Submit to Congress an annual program budget justification with 
explanation of each HSRCA and its performance and proposed funding 
level. 
8. Submit to Congress an annual report that outlines the specific purposes of 
the individual HSRCA, its performance evaluations, long and short-term 
goals, nature and extent of how agencies are sharing information, 
technological systems being employed, and how well they are conducting 
enforcement in cooperation with Joint Terrorism Task Forces.  
To receive funds under this program each HSRCA must be governed by an 
executive board. Due to the fact that the emphasis is specially placed on increasing 
participation by state, local and federal agencies, each executive board shall consist of an 
odd number of senior administrators from the law enforcement agencies that are 
participating from the region. One third of the board shall consist of federal agency 
representatives who are the senior agency official for an involved state or region. 
Representation should also include the head of each state police agency and the State 
Director of Homeland Security. Local agency composition should have representatives 
from metropolitan and rural areas.  
Executive board responsibilities shall include: 
1. Providing overall direction and oversight of the HSRCA. 
2. Appointing and supervising a director who manages the HSRCA. 
3. By vote, selecting an executive board chairperson and vice chair. 
4. Establishing and dissolving sub-committees as needed. 
5. Developing strategies, initiatives and budgets. 
6. Establishing and ensuring that the goals of the HSRCA are accomplished. 
7. Reviewing and approving all funding proposals consistent with the overall 
objectives of the HSRCA. 
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8. Managing the funds and financial responsibilities of the HSRCA. 
9. Reviewing and approving all reports. 
10. Ensuring accountability of the initiatives, and that they will accomplish 
what they set out to do, or identify annually why they were unsuccessful 
and how they plan to rectify the plan. It is critical that the executive board 
place on corrective action or discontinue any initiative that is not operating 
effectively and in compliance with all program guidance and polices. 
 
The executive board will select a most highly qualified individual to serve as the 
director of the specific HSRCA. The director reports to the executive board and liaisons 
with DHS to ensure complete coordination. Additional responsibilities of the director 
include: 
1. Developing and updating policy and procedures that are approved by the 
executive board. 
2. Representing the executive board in all matters related to the programs 
operation. 
3. Manage the staff and day-to-day operation of the HSRCA. 
4. Ensure financial accountability of the program with required reports and 
audits. 
5. Be a subject matter expert to the executive board and conduct research and 
make reports as necessary or required.74 
C. BUILDING A STRONG CONCEPTUAL REGIONAL MODEL 
1. The Executive Board 
The most important component of this conceptual national program model is that 
it allows at the regional level an opportunity to bring together agency administrators from 
federal, state and local agencies who have the shared power and responsibility to design 
how they will collaboratively attack the real potentials of terrorism that exist within their 
jurisdictional areas of responsibility. They are no longer a single agency head who 
receives federal funding for their department that can only be used for specific equipment 
                                                 
74 Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Title III- High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas,” 1-3.  
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and programs or that may or may not complement what the other surrounding 
jurisdictions are doing. They are part of a collaborative body that shares success and 
failures. This is why the executive board of each HSRCA will be so powerfully able to 
assess the national and regional intelligence and use it to design a strategy with realistic 
goals and objectives that requires interagency collaboration.  
A successful board can not afford to allow initiatives within its program to 
flounder, as ignoring poor performance will influence the success and funding levels for 
the overall region. The balance of federal, state and local representation on the board 
provides opportunities to understand and leverage existing agency resources that are 
available. The communication that takes place at this level prevents duplication of efforts 
and provides a means to establish goals that all involved can be party to. Another 
important aspect of the executive board is the integrity that is maintained by the group.  
As the board must find consensus on issues, it is much less likely to make decisions that 
are of questionable intent or of insincere value. This social aspect adds to the 
accountability of the program.  
2. True, Effective Interagency Relationships and Communication 
Relationship building is a key to successful interagency cooperation. The design 
and structure of the executive board creates an opportunity for federal, state and local 
agencies to agree on what needs to be done in their region and to create a strategy for 
how to be successful as a team. They are empowered to apply funding to initiatives 
within the regional program that involve cooperative participation from officers with the 
various agencies represented. This is not to say that every initiative must have 
representation from all involved agencies in the HSRCA, but each initiative must involve 
collaboration between some of the agencies and be designed to complement the overall 
regional objectives.  
As one recalls the Rocky Mountain Highway Patrol Network that was examined 
in Chapter V, one can see an initiative that allows each participating agency to receive 
funding through a process of evaluation, planning and coordinating that takes place in a 
very non-competitive environment. A sense of camaraderie can be developed from this 
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bottom up approach where each agency identifies what resources and capabilities they 
can apply to the problem and leverage that effectiveness by adding equipment, training, 
information sharing and coordinated projects that are made available from the 
RMHIDTA.  
Thomas Gorman is the director of RMHIDTA. During a recent discussion 
regarding limited resources, Mr. Gorman stated, “I have not seen in my career a better 
example of agency administrators being more concerned with the needs of the program 
than what they can obtain for their agency.”75 This is a compliment to this group, but it 
also represents the social opportunities that are availed when people from various 
agencies can come together and be part of an informed process to address common, 
critical goals. 
3. The Budget Process 
It is proposed that Congress will set aside specific funding for the HSRCA 
Program and that DHS will be the administrator. Each region of the country will receive 
specific funding for law enforcement preventive purposes based on a formula that will 
need to be determined through consistent practices. The budget cycle will follow normal 
federal timelines. The regional program will receive notification of the amount of funding 
for its overall program. The following diagram illustrates proposed steps for the regional 
budget cycle (Figure 7):  
                                                 
75 Thomas Gorman, Rocky Mountain HIDTA Executive Board Meeting Comments (author notes, 
Rocky Mountain HIDTA Executive Board Meeting, Denver, Colorado, September 9, 2008). 
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Figure 7.   HSRCA Budget Cycle 
The HSRCA’s will assess their initiatives to ensure that appropriate guidelines 
and procedures are followed. These should take place regularly to provide accountability 
of the initiatives and maintain the credibility of the regional and national programs. DHS 
will follow up with regular audits of the regional programs. 
D. REGIONAL DIRECTORS 
The director is another key component to having a successful regional homeland 
security program. The director is responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
program. He or she must provide the administrative guidance necessary for effective and 
innovative program management. The director shall develop the policy and procedures 
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and monitor initiatives for compliance issues. In addition, the director shall manage the 
HSRCA staff to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the program. The director will 
oversee the financial manager and ensure fiscal responsibility is maintained.  
The executive board must be careful to select a director who is credible with a 
distinguished background and is energetic. The director must have exceptional people 
and communication skills and use them to keep the executive board informed and the 
initiatives well-coordinated. The director assists the executive board chairperson and 
plays a key role in facilitating effective board meetings. He or she must have the 
expertise necessary for providing the day-to-day leadership that keeps the program on 
track. Moreover, the director will be a subject matter advisor to the board and make 
qualified recommendations regarding the performance of individual initiatives. The 
director has the opportunity to identify problems before they become unmanageable. 
Although the director does not work for DHS, they serve as the liaison between the board 
and DHS officials.  Effective communication at this level is essential. 
E. INITIATIVES / TASK FORCES 
The other critical component to this model is the individual initiatives/taskforces 
that are established and operate within the regional HSRCA. These initiatives should be 
constructed in a manner that is brings federal, state and local agencies together in a 
focused manner. Their development will apply action towards addressing problems and 
meeting homeland security goals and objectives that have been established by DHS and, 
more specifically, by the regional executive board. This is where the true application of 
taking existing resources and complementing them with assets made available from the 
HSRCA can lead to efficiencies.  
Several taskforces can be developed in a multi-state HSRCA. Two that should be 
paramount are initiatives that link each state’s information fusion centers, state police and 
critical infrastructure protection units.  All initiatives should be managed and coordinated 
by a command level staff that is set below the senior administrator level that makes up 
the executive board. These commanders are closer to problem and have more  
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understanding of what it will take to successfully address the needs that are identified in 
an efficient realistic way. This is the key point in the process where Intelligence Led 
Policing (ILP) should be applied.  
The 9/11 Commission Report that examined the federal government’s failure to 
prevent the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks cited a “lack of imagination” as a 
primary reason why officials were unable to connect the data dots and take action.76 As 
noted by the Commission, a secure homeland depends on the state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement officers in our communities. These individuals are the people best 
positioned, not only to observe criminal and other activity that might be the first sign of a 
terrorist plot, but also to help thwart attacks before they happen.77  
This conceptual regional approach to problem solving allows the initiative 
commanders the flexibility to understand the objectives and goals that have been set by 
the executive board, to have situational awareness with the other agencies and initiatives 
in the region, and to develop plans accordingly on how they will contribute to the overall 
effort. The advantage of this concept is that these units can develop their plans and have 
them vetted through the executive board so that specific intelligence and specialized 
opportunities can be incorporated into the regional and national goals and objectives.  
Again, areas of the country have varied professional cultures, interagency 
relationships, administrative structures, and specialized capabilities that must be 
considered and exploited for maximum efficiency. These commanders have that 
opportunity for creativity with their savvy knowledge of their working environments to 
be able to design initiatives that satisfy the established goals and utilize the existing 
resources and relationships. This flexibility must be emphasized. The program has strong 
accountability that will ensure that each initiative is well developed and in coordination 
with the other initiatives. Part of the process involves annual evaluations and assessments 
by the HSRCA director, staff and executive board as well as from DHS. These checks 
                                                 
76 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 339.  
77 Bennie Thompson, comp., “Improving Information Sharing Between the Intelligence Community 
and State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement,” Report prepared by request of Democratic Staff of the 
House Committee on Homeland Security, (2006), 1, http://hsc-
democrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20060927193035-23713.pdf (accessed March 30, 2009). 
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and balances will be established to prevent individual initiatives from developing a 
“mission creep” that can take them off track from the other program’s initiatives.  
Statewide and regional meetings of these commanders provide the additional social 
interaction that contributes to their creative collaborative capacity.  
F. INFORMATION SHARING AND INTELLIGENCE 
1. Establishing Intelligence Priorities 
Developing information and intelligence sharing networks within each region will 
be paramount to this conceptual homeland security program. Each state agency within the 
HSRCA should be united in a combined initiative called a regional intelligence network 
(RIN), in order to create a more effective information and intelligence sharing 
opportunity. The RIN’s will be created to tie each state’s fusion center together with the 
others in their region in a consistent and familiar fashion.  
The commanders from each fusion center will form the coordinating committee 
and design the regional strategy, structure, plans and policies that will unite the centers 
and ensure efficient sharing of information between the states. Similar to the RMHPN 
that was examined in Chapter V; this HSRCA initiative will bring these fusion center 
commanders together for regular coordination meetings where relationships can be 
developed and in-common systems can be identified. The funding stream for this 
initiative can be used to develop each center’s needs individually and collectively while 
ensuring interoperability. As each HSRCA is established throughout the country, they 
will connect as regions and then each region to each other in creating a more robust 
national information sharing and intelligence network—the primary goal of homeland 
security in the first place. As regions develop, they will identify ways of overcoming 
technical and potential social obstacles that can interfere with information sharing. These 
successes will be shared with other regions in a regular team forum that brings more 
structure to the national effort.  
Regional intelligence priorities (RIP’s) need to be established by the fusion 
centers for each RIN. For example, in one RIN the intelligence priorities might be to 
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identify and investigate suspicious activity around power plants. In a neighboring 
region’s network there might not be a power plant; therefore, the intelligence priorities 
will be different. However, there will be occasions when the national mission will need 
every HSRCA RIN in the country to focus on the same intelligence priorities—such as 
illegal aliens suspected of smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) across the 
borders and into the states.   
The effort of identifying and apprehending these suspects and accompanying 
WMD would be a main intelligence priority throughout the country until the threat has 
subsided.  Intelligence priorities focus the investigative efforts of the regional or entire 
intelligence system toward common objectives and steer the accompanying law 
enforcement resources through ILP. Each RIN initiative will establish intelligence 
priorities for their region’s intelligence strategy. These priorities will change and modify 
as intelligence and circumstances dictate. 
G. THE POWER OF CONSISTENCY AND LEVERAGE 
One of the most significant advantages of the HSRCA program is that it provides 
a forum of regular communication that leads to more efficient use of funding and 
resources.  Providing relevant training and equipment is an important need for agencies 
engaged in homeland security missions. Funding should be used to establish a training 
division in each HSRCA. These training divisions will identify the training needs that 
correlate with the national and regional HSRCA’s missions and objectives and then 
develop training programs that deliver the highest caliber courses available to law 
enforcement officers and analysts throughout the region. These officers and analysts 
should also receive specific training together to fully integrate their investigative and 
analytical activity. This training can be structured to provide specific applications while 
creating consistencies that allow fusion centers, initiatives and participating agencies to 
more freely interact and coordinate operations. The training staff, with input from the 
executive board, initiative commander and students will be responsible for designing a 
program that suits the relevant needs of the regional participants. 
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Equipment purchases are a regular part of most grant allocations. The challenge 
can be the difficulty in proscribing what equipment is needed in specific areas and what 
equipment may already be available. By creating a collaborative environment within the 
HSRCA, an opportunity presents itself for multiple agencies to leverage their purchases 
based on their joint developed strategies and inventories of what already exists. This 
cooperative practice also creates increased buying power and interoperability. For 
example, if a common vendor can be identified that provides a product that allows 
efficient interoperability between state’s fusion centers in the region, then through 
agreement, the coordinating committee of the RIN can make that purchase together using 
their allotted funding. The same holds true for the other initiatives operating within the 
region.  
Using the HIDTA program model as a basis, a specified portion of Congressional 
homeland security appropriations should be identified for this regional collaboration. 
H. SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISONS OF PROGRAM ARCHITECTURE 
It can be difficult to compare one or more live, running programs currently in 
place versus that of a conceptual mental model, even using the Soft Systems 
Methodology. The following table (Table 2) was developed in an effort to provide a way 
to visually recognize the foundation on which the program architecture for HSRCA 
model would ideally be built on. The graph includes specific strengths copied from the 
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In summation, the HSRCA model proposes utilizing the strengths of proven, best-
practice programs in other areas of national security and crime prevention that have 
enormous seeds of potential when placed within a structure that supports homeland 
security needs—across the spectrum of the entire nation.  Utilizing this model program 
would blend the local culture, policies and resources with an accountable, federally-
funded program that would be utilized in the day-to-day duties of all law enforcement 
agencies to provide a comprehensive web of homeland security. 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The intent of this thesis was to examine current gaps in homeland security; to 
identify and study possible model programs that suggest best-practice accountability and 
lend themselves to improved multi-jurisdictional cooperation; and to determine if similar 
models could be applied for use in homeland security applications. Using a Soft Systems 
Methodology was important in the research process as it allowed examination and 
consideration of the human factors that quite often interfere with attaining true 
collaboration between organizations. Creating environments, where agency leaders can 
maintain their autonomy while feeling part of a greater cause, is the key to increasing 
opportunities for successful cooperative efforts among federal, state, local law 
enforcement agencies. This research looked at the HIDTA programs to determine if a 
similarly coordinated allocation of federal resources could be applied to a clearly defined 
and cooperative homeland security program that provided improved information sharing 
systems, equipment and training for all law enforcement operating in a specific 
geographic region.  Through a conceptual model, this thesis proposes that such a 
national-intelligence-led law enforcement program, which more significantly involves 
state and local agencies, can be designed to be much more efficient and economical than 
other applications that exist today.    
An effective program can be accomplished by developing a strategy that 
realistically connects federal, state and local law enforcement agencies by using their in 
common relationships, structures and linkages at a regional level.  The key is not to 
create a separate function of law enforcement but to incorporate homeland security into 
the regular day-to-day operations of law enforcement.  The guiding concept should be to 
connect the regular police activity of all state, local and tribal police agencies throughout 
the country in a win-win with their federal partners.  This can be accomplished by 
allowing key stakeholders at the state and local levels to participate in the specific design 




circumstances in various areas of the country can provide an opportunity for people in 
leadership positions to come together in a purposeful way and build an atmosphere of 
collaboration in a less competitive environment.  
Consideration for the human, social and cultural aspects of team building are 
often overlooked when administering national programs that are established in a manner 
that is expected to fit every jurisdiction and region. These human interactions are critical 
when considering the influences that can interfere with developing cooperative outcomes. 
Through examination of the HIDTA related programs, this thesis identified successful 
structures that contributed to a more bottom-up design of regional drug enforcement 
programs. The models that were explored demonstrated the potential for a similar hybrid 
design that could be delivered to state and local agencies as part of a national homeland 
security program. The conceptual model that was developed in Chapter VI outlined 
specifics of how such a collaborative program could be implemented in multi-state 
regions.   
Some significant factors that were presented in the conceptual model included: 
• Federal, state and local agency administrators being provided with opportunities to 
create working groups that come together in a power-sharing and less competitive 
environment.  
• Consideration of the human traits is beneficial when attempting to bring agencies 
together for the purpose of creating collaborative homeland security programs in a 
spirit of cooperation. 
• There are alternative designs that provide realistic opportunities to greatly improve 
information sharing and develop actionable intelligence at the state and local levels. 
These proposed improvements complement federal efforts and can tie the levels of 
government together. It offers opportunities to better coordinate regional information 
sharing by connecting the activity of state fusion centers. Such regional collaboration 
can be expanded into a more coordinated national network where fusion center 
commanders can directly apply their expertise to overcoming obstacles that inhibit 
efficiency. 
• This can be a national program with regional flexibility that provides state and local 
agency administrators with specific opportunities to design, manage and account for 
the federally funded initiatives being worked cooperatively by their law enforcement 
officers. 
• State and local agency leaders can become more involved by setting the regional 
goals, standards and objectives, which are based on realistic evaluations of existing 
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threats and agency’s capabilities.  This is accomplished in partnership with the senior 
federal agency administrators who live and work within the region, as opposed to 
those who are not familiar with the local and regional circumstances and professional 
cultures. This contributes to effective buy-in by the multi-agency participants and 
promotes a spirit of efficient cooperation that is often absent under other homeland 
security grant distribution methods.  
Distributing federal funding through this conceptual national program allows a 
senior-level executive board to determine strategic goals and objectives that address the 
specific threats that are presented within a given region and also tie into national 
objectives. It is through this process that a true web of homeland security can be created 
that detects terrorist operations through the regular course of state and local law 
enforcement activity. The more “boots on the ground” officers who can be trained in 
homeland security related matters will lead to more potential and actual interdiction of 
terrorist activity prior to an event.  The dedicated work of these officers needs to be 
effectively plugged into the co-developed information-sharing network of state and 
regional fusion centers. This increased amount of information sharing will provide added 
benefit to federal investigations because of the increased potential for connecting the 
dots. 
In the effort to solve problems, there often comes a time to step back, evaluate, 
and, perhaps, approach the problem from another angle.  Current methods of bringing 
together the effective use of state and local law enforcement agencies in national 
homeland security efforts has considerable room for improvement.  To continue down the 
current path places the country’s main homeland security reliance on federal law 
enforcement agencies and military branches that lack daily interaction with the public at 
large. The level of state and local law enforcement homeland security awareness and 
participation needs to be developed in much of the country. Without that, state and local 
law enforcement will remain underutilized and the opportunities for success by terrorist 
individuals and organizations will be more likely.   
A new conceptual model for state and local involvement in a national law 
enforcement approach to homeland security is not only necessary, but it is vital to 
increasing the long-term capabilities of preventing another 9/11 type event in an ever-
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changing terrorism environment.  It is through this proposed homeland security model 
that delivered programs with increased state, local and regional participation can be 
improved. The potential for more productive and coordinated information sharing will 
lead to evolving opportunities for terrorist interdiction.  A collaborative and less 
competitive environment will provide improved public safety, operational efficiency and 
esprit de corps among the cooperating agencies. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
It would be wise for future research to delve more into the social dynamics of 
group leaders and attempt to identify what circumstances might explain why one group is 
more effective at creating a collaborative environment than another given similar 
circumstances. This study offered that creating a shared-power, less-competitive 
environment for a program’s regional executive board naturally fosters collaboration. 
Additionally, it recommended that a strong and engaged director, with subject matter 
expertise, can facilitate more efficiency and cooperation among the group. Identifying 
ways to increase the likelihood that the executive boards will be able to operate at 
optimum efficiency deserves further study, but does not inhibit the potential of currently 
combining random groups of administrators under the proposed regional models and 
developing their interactive capability through the operational process. 
B. PROPOSAL 
There is sufficient evidence presented in this thesis to warrant consideration of a 
three-year pilot project on a regional basis. This amount of time allows for careful 
development, implementation and evaluation. This project should be adequately 
monitored and facilitated to ensure that problematic issues can be identified and 
adjustments made, so that the end product has the greatest potential for being expanded 
in an extremely useful and efficient national program. U.S. economist John Bates Clark 
once said, “A nearly ideal situation would be that in which, in every department or 
industry, there should be one great corporation working without friction and with 
enormous economy, and compelled to give to the public the full benefit of that 
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economy.”78 It is through the careful guidance of government agencies by administrators 
who are deeply committed to protecting the public that homeland security can be 
advanced. Steps need to be taken to place these administrators together in a non-
competitive environment that breeds collaboration. It is through these cooperative 
relationships that those who seek to harm citizens will be identified in advance and 
interdicted by dedicated law enforcement officers of all agencies who are sharing 
information and working together. 
                                                 
78 John Bates Clark and John Maurice Clark, The Control of Trusts (New York: Macmillan Co., 1912), 
http://encarta.msn.com/quote_561558626/Government_A_nearly_ideal_situation_would_be_that_in_whic
h_.html (accessed September 19, 2008). 
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